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Everyone, it seems, believes in dissent.1 Our political mythology promotes 
a romantic vision:  the solitary voice of reason, Holmes’ prescient dissents, the 
lone juror in Twelve Angry Men.2 When talking about the role dissenters play in 
democratic governance, scholars offer a more workmanlike view. The 
conventional understanding of dissent as a practice recognizes that dissent is 
more than culturally resonant; it is a political strategy. Like any minority 
faction, dissenters can often get the majority to soften its views or at least  
obtain a concession or two. Scholars thus grasp that dissenters can wield power 
through participation or presence rather than persuasion. 
On this conventional understanding of dissent, dissenters have two choices 
with regard to governance: act moderately or speak radically. To the extent that 
would-be dissenters want to govern—to engage in a public act, to wield the 
authority of the state3—they must try to influence the decisionmaking process. 
 
1. Robert Tsai argues there is a “cultural consensus” about the value of dissent and that 
the language of the First Amendment is “a patois spoken by most Americans.” Robert L. 
Tsai, Speech and Strife, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 85-86 (2004). 
2. Among modern First Amendment scholars, Steven Shiffrin most clearly mines this 
romantic tradition. See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, INJUSTICE, AND THE MEANINGS OF 
AMERICA (1999) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN, DISSENT]; STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990) [hereinafter SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE]. 
3. Throughout the paper, I use variants of these terms—public act, acting with the 
authority of the state, acting on behalf of the state, speaking truth with power—to convey the 
notion that would-be dissenters wield state power by rendering a decision on behalf of the 
government or some part of it. Although these terms come closest to conveying what is at 
stake here, they tread upon certain terms of art deployed in other literatures. For instance, in 
describing the way dissenters issue a decision on behalf of the state, I do not mean to invoke 
the notion of state action, a term of art used in identifying a constitutional harm. If I were 
describing state actors in the sense it is used in certain legal contexts, it would be 
underinclusive, as a judge writing a dissenting opinion or a legislator drafting a minority 
report would presumably be deemed a state actor for some purposes. Similarly, in some 
literatures, a public act refers not just to a governmental decision, but to anything done 
outside the privacy of one’s home or in the presence of other members of one’s community. 
Similarly, speaking truth with power here refers not to power in the most general of senses—
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They will thus bargain with their votes and with the threat of public dissent to 
gain concessions from the majority. Would-be dissenters who deploy this 
strategy get to take part in an act of governance, but it is governance of a 
moderate sort. And even if the dissenter gets an opportunity to wield the 
authority of the state, dissent takes the form of an argument, one designed to 
persuade other members of the decisionmaking body to take a different stance. 
Dissenters speak truth to power—to those with a majority of the votes. 
Alternatively, would-be dissenters on the conventional view can speak 
radically—that is, they can freely state the position they believe that the 
majority ought to take in a dissenting opinion or minority report. In doing so, 
dissenters sacrifice the chance to be part of the governing majority and thus to 
wield the authority of the state. When they speak, it is with a critical rather than 
authoritative voice; they speak on behalf of themselves, not the polity. Dissent, 
again, takes the form of an argument, speaking truth to power. 
What is missing from the usual account of dissent is a third possibility: that 
would-be dissenters could act radically. We have trouble envisioning dissent 
taking the form of state action. Our conventional intuition is that dissenters will 
try to change decisionmakers’ minds, they may even moderate the decision 
rendered, but they will not—and ought not—determine the outcome of decision 
unless they can persuade the majority to alter its views. 
The assumption underlying this conventional view of dissent is that dissent 
means speaking truth to power, not with it. That is, we assume that dissenters 
will be in the minority on any decisionmaking body. After all, we might think, 
if would-be dissenters had enough votes to control the outcome of the 
decisionmaking process, they wouldn’t be “dissenters” anymore. “Dissenting 
by deciding” seems like a contradiction in terms.4 
The main reason we overlook the possibility of dissenting by deciding is 
that we tend to conceive of democratic bodies as unitary—there is 
one legislature rendering the law, one populace voting on the initiative. It is 
thus quite difficult to discern what power an electoral minority ought to have in 
making the decision. Our intuitions about the legitimacy of majority rule lead 
us to resist proposals to allow would-be dissenters to “take turns”5 in exercising 
majority power or to create a minority veto. We thus assume that the best—
perhaps the only—model for distributing power fairly is to let electoral 
minorities influence a governmental decision or, failing that, to make their 
 
that is, capable of having an effect—but governmental power. 
4. Throughout this paper, the terms decision or action refer to a governance decision or 
an action of the state. Thus, in using these terms, I am not describing dissent that takes the 
form of a private action, like civil disobedience. See infra text accompanying notes 33-37, 
96-102 (analyzing the relationship between civil disobedience and dissenting by deciding). 
Further, as Bill Stuntz has pointed out to me, dissenting by deciding could also take the form 
of inaction—e.g., a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute certain kinds of cases. I set such 
examples aside for purposes of this paper, although the issue is one well worth exploring. 
5. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY 5 (1994). 
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disagreement known publicly. 
Where decisionmaking power is disaggregated—as with juries, school 
committees, local governments, even states in a federal system—there are more 
options for thinking about how to allocate decisionmaking authority among 
members of the minority and majority. Disaggregated institutions create the 
opportunity for global minorities to constitute local majorities.  They thus allow 
dissenters to decide, to act on behalf of the state. Dissenting by deciding occurs 
when would-be dissenters—individuals who hold a minority view within the 
polity as a whole—enjoy a local majority on a decisionmaking body and can 
thus dictate the outcome.   
 One example of dissenting by deciding occurred in San Francisco shortly 
before the time of this writing. The city spent several weeks marrying gay and 
lesbian couples until a court put a halt to its activities. San Francisco officials 
surely understood that, with respect to the state population, theirs was the 
minority view. They surely understood their action to be a challenge of sorts to 
the prevailing view,6 and that assessment was shared by others.7 The principle 
embodied in San Francisco’s decision was no different than the argument found 
in editorials, judicial dissents, and ongoing debates about the status of gays and 
lesbians in this country. What was different was the form dissent took.
 Dissenting by deciding also takes place when a school board chooses to 
mandate the teaching of creationism8 or a jury filled with those who think our 
sentencing regime is too harsh vote to nullify. The members of each of these 
decisionmaking bodies subscribe to the same set of commitments held by 
individuals whom we would unthinkingly term “dissenters.” But they express 
disagreement not through a weblog, a protest, or an editorial, but by offering a 
real-life instantiation of their views. While calling these examples “dissent” 
may seem counterintuitive, each involves an act of contestation, an attempt to 
express disagreement with the majority’s view. What makes these acts unique 
is the unusual institutional form dissent takes in each instance.  
Dissenting by deciding, then, should be understood as an alternative 
 
6. Mayor Newsom, for instance, has invoked Martin Luther King’s famous argument 
in favor of civil disobedience in justifying San Francisco’s decision. 
http://www.gavinnewsom.com/index.php?id+47 (last visited Mar. 1, 2005) (reprinting 
transcript of an interview with Gavin Newsom where he invoked King’s “Letter from a 
Birmingham Jail”). 
7. See, e.g., Editorial, The Road to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A12 
(arguing that San Francisco’s mayor was engaged in a “civil rights tradition” akin to refusing 
to obey Jim Crow laws); see also infra note 40. 
8. This claim is admittedly a bit slippery. While I think it is fair to say that creationists 
are thought to hold the minority view and certainly do not find their policy preferences 
reflected in a majority of local institutions, let alone in national educational policy, some 
polls suggest that a majority of U.S. citizens would support the teaching of creationism 
alongside evolution in public schools. See Derek H. Davis, Kansas versus Darwin: 
Examining the History and Future of the Creationism-Evolution Controversy in American 
Public Schools, 9 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 207 (1999). 
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strategy for institutionalizing channels for dissent within the democratic 
process. But because dissent has not been conceptualized in these terms, 
scholars have not given adequate thought to which form of dissent is 
preferable, and when. This paper takes a first step in that direction by analyzing 
what makes decisional dissent different from our usual understanding of 
dissent. It organizes the analysis around three of the main reasons we value 
dissent: it can contribute to the marketplace of ideas, engages electoral 
minorities in the project of self-governance, and facilitates self-expression.9  
The paper then considers the ways in which dissenting by deciding might 
further those goals differently than conventional dissent. In doing so, it starts to 
develop an analytic framework for thinking about whether and when we might 
value decisions that take this unusual form. Drawing upon a wide range of 
literatures—from First Amendment scholarship to cutting-edge research on 
group decisionmaking, from the literature on federalism to writings on the 
politics of recognition—the paper identifies what this framework reveals to be 
a recurring set of trade-offs in a wide variety of debates about institutional 
design. The payoff for thinking about dissent in the terms proposed here is a 
more comprehensive set of categories for thinking about how best to 
institutionalize it. 
The argument runs roughly as follows: Conventional dissent and dissenting 
by deciding both further the main purposes that dissent serves, but in quite 
different ways. For example, some value dissent because they subscribe to the 
traditional Millian view that exposure to a wide range of views improves the 
quality of our decisions. To the extent we value a robust marketplace of ideas, 
however, dissent must be visible. And dissenting by deciding represents a 
different institutional strategy for making dissent visible than conventional 
dissent because it takes the form of a governmental decision, not an argument. 
A second reason we value dissent is because it can engage electoral 
minorities in the project of self-governance. Some scholars have argued that 
creating avenues for expressing disagreement is crucial for establishing the 
 
9. These arguments are organized very loosely around three major theories 
undergirding First Amendment law, as that is the area where legal scholars have thought 
most systematically about dissent in its conventional form. But see SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE, 
supra note 2 (arguing that the notion of dissent has not been sufficiently central to our 
understanding of the First Amendment). I draw these categories from Emerson’s catalog of 
reasons for valuing speech: Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First 
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1973) [hereinafter Emerson, General Theory], and the book 
that emerged from it, THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970). 
Although First Amendment scholarship helps frame the inquiry, I do not intend to push the 
analogy too far. For instance, I do not wish to suggest here that electoral minorities have a 
“right” to issue an outlier decision. Some scholars have gone further and posited a 
relationship between local decisionmaking and First Amendment rights (not just First 
Amendment values). See, e.g., Matthew R. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy 
Initiatives and Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 1 (1999); Ernest A. Young, Welcome to the Dark Side: Liberals Rediscover 
Federalism in the Wake of the War on Terror, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1277, 1295-1301 (2004). 
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government’s legitimacy in the eyes of an electoral minority. Conventional 
dissent and dissenting by deciding further that end in different ways. 
Conventional dissent gives electoral minorities an opportunity to speak truth to 
power, either by acting moderately within a decisionmaking process or 
speaking radically outside of it. Dissenting by deciding goes one step further; it 
grants electoral minorities not merely the power to protest, but the power to 
decide—a chance to speak truth with power. Would-be dissenters need not 
moderate their stance in order to take part in the project of governance. Self-
expression does not undermine opportunities for self-rule. Instead, fusing an act 
of contestation with an act of governance, dissenting by deciding allows a 
dissenter to reaffirm her allegiance to the polity at the same moment she 
expresses her disagreement with the majority’s view. 
Finally, to the extent that we value dissent because it provides individuals a 
chance to express and define their identity, dissenting by deciding offers an 
intriguing strategy for furthering that aim. Under a conventional view of 
dissent, when dissenters take part in the process of governing, they act in 
relative isolation from other members of their group. They have an opportunity 
to express themselves, but only in a context that reproduces the same power 
disparities group members routinely experience outside the governance context. 
If dissenters wish to dissent collectively—with a critical mass of group 
members exercising full control over the message they express—they must 
withdraw to a private enclave to do so. 
Dissenting by deciding fuses the collective act with the public one, 
allowing electoral minorities to act collectively at the same moment they act on 
behalf of the polity. It thus offers neither the risk of a permanent minority status 
in the civic realm nor the safety of a private enclave. As with a private enclave, 
racial minorities exercise control over the decision. But that control stems not 
from the exclusion of members of the majority from the discussion, but from 
the power of concentrated numbers—the same type of power enjoyed by 
members of the majority in most instances. Identity is thus forged in the 
presence of internal and external dissent—with a critical mass of would-be 
dissenters (who may disagree about the nature or even the existence of the 
group’s identity) as well as with members of the majority who may support or 
oppose the decision. 
For each argument sketched above, there is a set of trade-offs and risks 
involved in the choice between conventional and decisional dissent. Dissent 
that takes the form of a decision is different from, but not necessarily better 
than, dissent that takes the form of an argument. Pouring dissent into the mold 
of a decision may lend it concreteness and weight in the marketplace of ideas, 
but it may also alter or obscure the content of the dissenters’ views. Giving 
dissenters a chance to speak truth with power may seem like a more radical 
form of dissent because it allows dissenters to use the apparatus of governance 
to express their disagreement. But fusing an act of opposition with an act of 
affiliation may risk taming dissent in the long run. Finally, while dissenting by 
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deciding allows electoral minorities to act collectively, rather than in isolation, 
when taking part in the process of governance, that process may sometimes be 
a forum non conveniens for the expression of group identity. 
For each set of arguments identified above, the Article compares decisional 
dissent to a more familiar institutional strategy for advancing the aims of 
dissent. The first Part focuses on the place decisional dissent might occupy in 
the marketplace of ideas and contrasts dissenting by deciding with Cass 
Sunstein’s recent proposals for institutionalizing dissent. The second Part 
considers the role dissenting by deciding could play in engaging minorities in 
the project of self-governance and uses federalism as a counterpoint to the 
analysis. The third analyzes the relationship between decisional dissent and 
self-expression, using the politics of recognition as a baseline for comparison. 
Taken together, these three Parts provide a framework for thinking more 
systematically about when and where we might value dissent that takes this 
unusual institutional form. 
Two caveats are in order. First, much of the Article is devoted to 
explicating the affirmative case for dissenting by deciding. That is because, for 
the reasons noted above, the arguments in favor of conventional dissent have 
been thoroughly canvassed in the literature. While the Article blends 
descriptive and normative elements—it tries to offer the most attractive 
explanation available for an existing feature of our democratic infrastructure—I 
do not intend to suggest that we ought to make dissenting by deciding possible 
in every context. The purpose of the Article is simply to identify the benefits 
decisional dissent offers and to provide a framework for identifying the trade-
offs and risks inherent in the choice to pursue those benefits. 
Second, the Article is cast at a fairly high level of generality. While it 
provides some examples to ground the analysis, it does not offer the sort of 
contextual details that would be necessary to decide precisely when dissenting 
by deciding is a preferable strategy for institutionalizing dissent. To make such 
judgments, we would require more detailed information about the identity of 
the dissenter and the culture of the political community as a whole, the nature 
of the institutional mission, the dynamics of the political order, and the social 
domain in which decisional dissent would arise.10 
Part I of this Article puts some meat on the bones of the definition of 
decisional dissent and deals with several preliminary counterarguments. Part II 
contrasts the ways in which dissenting by deciding and conventional dissent 
further three of the main goals of dissent. Part III offers some initial 
observations about whether and when we would choose decisional dissent over 
conventional dissent. 
 
10. See generally ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS (1995). 
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I. THE FORM DISSENT TAKES 
A. The Identity of the Dissenter 
The dictionary defines dissent simply as “withhold[ing] assent; not 
approv[ing]; object[ing].”11 This paper uses the term dissenter in a more 
specific sense, to refer to someone who subscribes to an outlier view on an 
issue that she deems salient to her identity. A dissenter is someone whom we 
would naturally term an “electoral minority” because of the positions she holds. 
The arguments deployed here can be applied to many types of electoral 
minorities—racial, socio-economic, political, religious—provided that the 
views of the population are divided along some axis of difference and the issue 
is one that individuals would deem germane to their political identity. 
Individuals are, of course, complex and multifaceted, and the identity 
categories used to identify dissenters are not meant to be reductive. Even if 
every individual has the potential to be in the minority on some issue, my 
assumption here is that there are categories that will be salient to the political 
process—that will divide the polity along regular lines—even if the precise 
boundaries of these divisions are either porous or contingent. Even in a Dahlian 
world where the majority is made up of constantly shifting coalitions,12 there 
may nonetheless be groups that are permanently in the minority on some 
meaningful subset of issues.13 Thus, the term dissenter, as used here, refers not 
to someone who happens to be occasionally outvoted in a world of fluid 
coalition politics, but to someone trapped in a more stable political dynamic. 
The reason to exclude from the definition of dissent someone who merely 
has a different set of preferences than the majority’s is that this problem 
presumably could be fixed by a mutually acceptable Tieboutian solution.14 I 
thus wish to confine the term to instances of political disagreement—
 
11. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
656 (1993 unabridged ed.). 
12. See, e.g., ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); ROBERT 
A. DAHL, POLYARCHY (1971). 
13. Thanks to Kenji Yoshino for suggesting this formulation. 
14. I refer, of course, to a situation in which citizens differ as to which set of policies 
they prefer and are willing to allow others to make their own choices. In such situations, 
many have argued for local variation—regionalism or federalism—so that everyone can 
maximize her preferences by choosing among the offerings of different localities. The 
seminal work is Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 
416 (1956). The idea is nicely illustrated by Michael McConnell’s oft-cited example: 
[A]ssume that there are only two states, with equal populations of 100 each. Assume further 
that 70 percent of State A, and only 40 percent of State B, wish to outlaw smoking in public 
buildings. The others are opposed. If the decision is made on a national basis by a majority 
rule, 110 people will be pleased, and 90 displeased. If a separate decision is made by 
majorities in each state, 130 will be pleased, and only 70 displeased. The level of satisfaction 
will be still greater if some smokers in State A decide to move to State B . . . . 
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1484, 1494 (1987). 
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disagreement that stems from political principle15—where we can identify 
winners and losers.   
Although the term dissenter, as used in this Article, could apply to a 
variety of political outsiders, the arguments in favor of decisional dissent are at 
their strongest when the dissenters in question are members of a subordinated 
group: those instances where disagreement corresponds to power disparities 
and the continuing legacy of past discrimination, where outlier policy 
preferences overlap with an outlier social status.16 (Consider, for instance, 
whether we might intuitively think of jury nullification differently if the jurors 
are all-white or all-African-American.) It is in such instances that the questions 
surrounding dissent seem the most intractable and dissenting by deciding may 
offer an especially intriguing set of solutions. Because decisional dissent entails 
not just the dissemination of an outlier view, but the empowerment of would-be 
dissenters, it may partially address both the problem of disagreement and the 
problem of inequality. On this view, dissenting by deciding could be thought of 
as a process-based strategy for addressing the problem of subordination.17 
Finally, for simplicity’s sake, the paper deploys a fairly static frame for 
determining who constitutes a “dissenter.” One would expect, of course, that 
the identity of dissenters would be endogenous—that the composition of the 
dissenting group and even the boundaries of its identity would be influenced by 
the options for dissent available. We would similarly expect that dissenting by 
deciding would generate a distinct dynamic in the relationship between the 
majority and minority, changing the incentives that guide the actions of each 
and perhaps even altering the boundaries that define them. While I address 
some of these issues in this paper18 and elsewhere,19 I leave a full account of 
these complexities for another day.   
B. What Makes Dissenting by Deciding Different? 
There are three main difference between the form taken by conventional 
and decisional dissent: (1) dissenting by deciding is embodied in a decision, not 
 
15. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §55, at 365 (1971) 
16. This definition thus bears some resemblance to the definition of racial vote dilution 
used in election law circles. Cf. Chandler Davidson, Minority Vote Dilution: An Overview, in 
MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 1-23 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984). For empirical analyses of the 
overlap between race and perspective, see generally DONALD R. KINGER & LYNN M. 
SANDERS, DIVIDED BY COLOR: RACIAL POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS (1996); JENNIFER 
HOCHSCHILD, FACING UP TO THE AMERICAN DREAM: RACE, CLASS, AND THE SOUL OF THE 
NATION (1996). 
17. I am especially indebted to Frank Michelman for raising this question and to Kenji 
Yoshino for helping me formulate a response. 
18. Infra text accompanying notes 69-71, 112-113, 150-152, 172-175. 
19. See Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1142-
52, 1175-76, 1193-95 (2005).  
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an argument; (2) it gives electoral minorities a chance to speak truth with 
power, fusing an act of contestation with an act of affiliation; and (3) dissenters 
who decide are able to act with the authority of the state collectively rather than 
in relative isolation. While I explore each  in greater detail in Part II, let me put 
a few examples on the table to fill in the definition of decisional dissent and 
deal with some obvious counterarguments. 
As I explore in greater detail in Part II.A, one key difference between 
conventional dissent and dissenting by deciding is that the latter takes the form 
of a decision, not an argument. As noted above,20 conventional dissenters have 
two choices: act moderately or speak radically.21 In either case, dissenters make 
arguments. Dissenters who act moderately try to persuade the majority on the 
decisionmaking body to soften its views. Dissenters who speak radically also 
make an argument, one directed both to majority of the decisionmaking body 
and to those outside of it.22    
Acting radically, in contrast, allows dissenters to express their 
disagreement through a decision. They are able to offer a real-world example of 
what their principles would look like in practice. Consider the San Francisco 
example again. During the period that San Francisco married gays and lesbians, 
newspapers across the country carried stories about the marriages of elderly 
lesbian couples or gay lovers who had raised children together. As a result, we 
now have a concrete practice, not just an abstract issue, to debate. As The New 
York Times explained, “[t]he television images from San Francisco brought gay 
marriage into America’s living rooms in a way no court decision could.”23 One 
supporter of the decision sounded a similar theme, arguing that San Francisco’s 
decision “put a face on discrimination.”24 
Consider also Ernest Young’s intriguing claim about the relationship 
between federalism and political opposition. Young argues that opposition 
parties in federal systems are more successful than those, like the British 
Tories, in non-federal systems because the former have a chance to govern in 
some subpart of the system. Both Tories and present-day Democrats are 
challenging the national dominance of another party. But contestation takes a 
special form in the United States. In Young’s view, “because the loyal 
opposition can not only oppose but actually govern at the state level” in federal 
 
20. Supra text accompanying notes 2-4. 
21. They can, of course, do both at the same time—that is, speak radically in the hope 
of getting more concessions when they are ready to act. 
22. Those who act moderately, of course, get to render a decision. But at the moment 
they render that decision, they are no longer expressing disagreement; they are 
compromising their views in order to join the decision. See infra note 94 (offering further 
analysis of this distinction). 
23. Editorial, supra note 20. 
24. Carla Marinucci, Newsom in Spotlight—Even if Gay Marriage Issue Isn’t, S.F. 
CHRON., July 28, 2004, A10 (quoting Pam Cooke).  
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systems, it can “develop a track record of success.”25 Thus, he argues, “the 
Democrats’ control of so many statehouses” after losing the Senate in 2002 
“‘prepared the ground for a revival of their own party,’” whereas the Tories’ 
electoral failures can be attributed at least in part to the fact that “‘they lack a 
testing ground for their ideas.’”26 In Young’s view, it is not a coincidence that 
“four of the last five presidents were former governors who developed a 
reputation for competence at the state level while the other party held the White 
House.”27 I will have more to say about the relationship between dissenting by 
deciding and federalism;28 for the moment, suffice it to say that federalism 
offers a good example of decisional dissent. 
One might object that dissent cannot be expressed through a decision. 
Plainly the objection is not that dissent must take the form of speech, as there 
are numerous examples—most notably acts of civil disobedience29—of dissent 
being expressed through action. The concern instead is that the notion of 
dissenters wielding state power is a contradiction in terms. 
Such a claim takes an unduly narrow view of power in the disaggregated 
institutions that are the subject of this Article. Where an institution is 
disaggregated, the power of the polity—by which I mean the political 
community whose governing system includes that institution30—is parceled out 
to a number of smaller decisionmaking bodies. A disaggregated structure 
creates the possibility that electoral minorities can wield control over some 
subset of decisions without violating the principle of majority rule—an 
institutional design strategy that generates a range of intriguing democratic 
possibilities explored here and in a companion piece in the Harvard Law 
Review.31 But the fact that electoral minorities wield control over some 
decisions within a disaggregated structure does not alter their status as 
 
25. Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalism, Ernest Young, The 
Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV 1, 58 (2005). 
26. Id. (quoting A Tale of Two Legacies, ECONOMIST, Dec. 19, 2002, #)  
27. Id. at 59. 
28. Infra Part II.B.2. 
29. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text (exploring connections between 
decisional dissent and civil disobedience). 
30. Thus, when a jury renders a decision, the “polity” encompasses the citizens of the 
state or nation of which the jury system is a part. When a state renders a decision, the 
“polity” would refer to the national citizenry. The odd case is one like San Francisco, where 
a local government renders a decision that citizens nationwide find affects them, either 
directly or indirectly. Here, the polity could be the state of California, the nation, or both. 
One could, of course, imagine the infinite regress—we are all, after all, theoretically 
members of the “world polity.” Whether or not there is a meaningful concept we could term 
the world polity, here I will stick to easily identified institutional arrangements and 
membership categories found within the United States. 
31. See Gerken, supra note 19. This article is concerned not with the question of 
dissent, but the instrumental and intrinsic values associated with varying the membership of 
disaggregated decisionmaking bodies. It thus addresses some normative and empirical 
debates that are not discussed here. 
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dissenters. The power of the dissenter in such instances is partial—confined 
temporally or spatially. For example, dissenters may control one jury or school 
committee. Even within that institution, decisions dissenters render will be 
outliers, and the views of the majority will prevail in most of the decisions 
made within that institution. Nor will dissenters control the central 
decisionmaking body (usually a legislature) that sets statewide policies; they 
may thus succeed in enacting a policy locally only to have it subsequently 
overturned at the state level.32 The fact that dissenters use temporally or 
spatially restricted power to express their views should not be mistaken for a 
fundamental change in power dynamics in the state as a whole; a statewide 
minority remains a statewide minority. Dissenting by deciding should thus not 
be mistaken for a reversal of fortune. 
A second key difference between conventional dissent and decisional 
dissent is that dissenters speak truth with power, thus fusing an act of 
contestation with an act of affiliation. As I explore in greater detail in Part II.B, 
decisional dissent allows dissenters to challenge the majority’s views at the 
same moment they act on behalf of the state. Ardent environmentalists on a 
zoning board, for instance, are not merely attacking the majority’s preferred 
regulatory strategy; they are actively engaged in on-the-ground policymaking. 
Advocates of creationism are not merely challenging the dominance of 
evolution in the educational system; they are shouldering the duties of 
citizenship and implementing the educational strategy they think best serves the 
community.       
Some might object that there is a difference between adopting an outlier 
policy and engaging in an act of opposition.33 The argument would be that one 
cannot simultaneously oppose the state and act on its behalf. Dissenting by 
deciding looks like a contradiction in terms.   
The practice of civil disobedience calls that sharp dichotomy into question. 
Civil disobedience—a well-known variant of dissent—involves “the purposeful 
and public defiance of an established law or norm, undertaken with the intent of 
altering state policy.”34 But civil disobedience is not purely oppositional. To 
the contrary, it is both an act of affiliation and of contestation. Martin Luther 
King described civil disobedience as “break[ing] an unjust law . . . openly, 
lovingly.”35 In the words of John Rawls, “[i]t expresses disobedience to law 
 
32. See infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text (exploring the effect that this fact 
may have democratic dynamics). 
33. I am indebted to Dick Fallon for raising this set of objections, and to Fred Schauer 
and Dick Fallon for helping me think through this problem.   
34. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 60 (Paul Barry Clarke & Joe Foweraker 
eds., 2001); see also JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE § 55, at 363, 365 (1971) (defining 
civil disobedience within a “more or less just democratic state” as “a political act not only in 
the sense that it is addressed to the majority that holds political power, but also because it is 
an act guided and justified by political principles . . . .”). 
35.  Martin Luther King, Jr., Letters from a Birmingham Jail, in A TESTAMENT OF 
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within the limits of fidelity to law . . . . The law is broken, but fidelity to law is 
expressed by the public and nonviolent nature of the act, by the willingness to 
accept the legal consequences of one’s conduct.”36   
Both civil disobedience and decisional dissent thus involve partial 
opposition.37  Those engaged in an act of civil disobedience defy the majority’s 
preferences, which have been enacted into law, while affirming their 
membership in the polity. Those engaged in decisional dissent defy the 
majority’s preferences, which are not yet enacted into law so explicitly as to 
preclude the decision, while affirming their membership in the polity. If we 
think of civil disobedience as a piece of political theater designed to signal 
partial disagreement, disaggregated power structures offer an institutional 
vehicle for achieving the same end. 
If one of the strengths of the decisional dissent model is that it represents 
an institutional strategy for signaling partial opposition, that may also be a 
weakness. The danger is that the model pulls in too much; it includes outlier 
decisions that neither reflect a desire to oppose an existing norm nor create the 
appearance of opposition.   
There are at least two responses to this concern. First, as a purely 
functional matter, whether or not those who issue outlier decisions understand 
themselves to be dissenters—and whether or not they are viewed as such—their 
actions further the same democratic aims that are served by conventional 
dissent. Treating these decisions as a form of dissent simply helps us think 
more systematically about the best institutional strategies for improving the 
democratic process. The functional account does not seem to require a more 
precise definition.38 
 Second, in assessing whether one can both dissent and decide, we might 
draw upon the rich and varied history of dissent, a tradition that dates back to 
Socrates and winds its way through centuries of U.S. history. To be sure, that 
tradition seems to have two main strands—speaking with permission (the free 
speech/free press tradition, in which the state recognizes the right of dissenters 
to speak against it) or acting without permission (civil disobedience). 
Dissenting by deciding—acting with permission—represents an unusual fusion 
 
HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 294 (Washington ed., 1986) 
36. RAWLS, supra note 24, at 366 (footnote omitted); see also King, supra note 35. 
Indeed, even conventional dissent is not always purely oppositional. Dissenters often affirm 
their loyalty to the polity while declaring their disagreement. See, e.g., Robert N. Strassfeld, 
Lose in Vietnam, Bring the Boys Home, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1891 (2004) (documenting the 
strategy of Vietnam protesters to counter their opponents’ equation of dissent and 
disloyalty). Steven Shiffrin even goes so far as to argue that dissent functions like “a cultural 
glue that binds [dissenters] to the political community.” SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra note 2, at 
18. 
37. Walzer makes this point about civil disobedience. Infra notes 91-97 and 
accompanying text. 
38. Except to the extent that subjective or objective intent is necessary to further 
dissent’s aims in practice. 
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of the two.  
 Nonetheless, this odd amalgam of dissenting practices has some historical 
roots in the dissent tradition. The decision of a jury to nullify, for instance, has 
long been understood as an act of democratic opposition.39 And there is no 
reason to think that what is common to both strands of the dissent tradition—a 
desire to oppose by the dissenters and the perception of opposition by the 
majority—is inconsistent with the notion of dissenting by deciding. To the 
contrary, it seems plausible to think that at least some decisionmakers who 
adopt outlier policies would think of themselves as dissenters and be viewed as 
such by the majority. Indeed, even without a popular conception of dissent 
capacious enough to encompass outlier decisions, we see scattered but 
tantalizing examples of this phenomenon in today’s political discourse.40 
A final, key difference between conventional dissent and dissenting by 
deciding is that the latter allows dissenters to act on behalf of the state 
collectively, rather than in relative isolation.41 As I explore in greater detail in  
Part II.C, under a conventional model, collective action for dissenters is 
necessarily private action. Conventional dissent entails electoral minorities’ 
engaging in an act of governance under roughly the same power dynamics that 
they experience elsewhere. Libertarians who constitute a fraction of the state’s 
population are also a minority on a jury. Greens who enjoy a small proportion 
of statewide votes hold just one seat on a zoning commission. In those 
 
39. See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 81-
118 (1998); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 3, 28-29 (2004). One can find other examples of dissent that involve 
unusual blends of the two strands of the dissent tradition. For instance, protestors have 
flooded courts or administrative agencies with huge numbers of cases in order to overwhelm 
them, thereby deploying a legal action to register opposition. Martha  Minow, Breaking the 
Law: Lawyers and Clients in Struggles for Social Change, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 723, 736 
(1991). Similarly, Martha Minow argues that efforts by the battered women’s movement to 
create shelters and support networks should be understood as an act of opposition, one that 
falls easily within the realm of legal conduct. Id. at 750-51.  
40.  See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, In Jury Rooms, A Form of Civil Protest Grows; Activists 
Registering Disdain for Laws With a “Not Guilty,” WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1999, at A1 
(documenting incidents of jury nullification and describing the jury box  as a “venue for 
registering dissent, more powerful than one vote at the polls and more effective at producing 
tangible, satisfying results”); Tatsha Roberston, Civil Disobedience Adds to Battle Over 
Same-Sex Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, March 15, 2004, at A1 (stating that local officials’ 
decision to marry gays and lesbians “provid[e] a rare instance in the nation’s history of 
individuals using the power of their government to commit acts of disobedience and fuel the 
engine of social change”); Charles Toutant, Ashbury Park’s Chance Card, 175 N.J.L.J. 1135 
(2004) (quoting professor for the view that the decision by local officials to marry gays and 
lesbians was a “constructive act[] of civil disobedience”); supra notes 6 (San Francisco 
mayor invoking tradition of dissent in explaining his action) and 7 (describing San 
Francisco’s gay marriage decision as civil disobedience). 
41. On the importance of community building for “nurtur[ing] the continuing capacity 
to dissent,” see SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra note 2, at 25; SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE, supra note 2, at 
90-93. 
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instances where racial identity and dissenting views meaningfully overlap, 
African-Americans or Latinos are isolated from other group members 
whenever they serve on a jury or school board. If members of dissenting groups 
wish to engage with a critical mass of group members, they cannot do so when 
acting on behalf of the state.  
 Dissenting by deciding, in contrast, fuses a public act with a collective one. 
Decisions are made by zoning boards dominated by Greens or juries controlled 
by libertarians. African-Americans and Latinos have ten seats on a jury or 
school board rather than two. Decisional dissent thus creates an unusual 
political space for electoral minorities, one where they can abandon their usual 
role as junior partners to the decision and can govern in the presence of a 
critical mass of members of the group.   
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FORM AND FUNCTION: DISSENTING BY 
DECIDING AND THE GOALS OF DISSENT 
 Once we have a sense of the differences in the forms taken by 
conventional and decisional dissent, we can think more systematically about 
which institutional strategy best serves our purposes in a given context. In this 
Part, I explore the connections between the three qualities that distinguish 
decisional from conventional dissent, canvassed above, with three of the 
primary purposes served by dissent: it contributes to the marketplace of ideas, 
engages electoral minorities in the project of self-governance, and facilitates 
self-expression. In each instance, I describe the relative costs and benefits of 
using decisional dissent to further the goal in question, and I ground the 
analysis by comparing dissenting by deciding to a more familiar institutional 
strategy for fostering dissent. 
A. The Role of Dissent in Improving Democratic Decisionmaking: Visibility 
and the Marketplace of Ideas 
One way to identify some of the differences between conventional dissent 
and dissenting by deciding is to think about how each serves one of the main 
goals of dissent: improving the quality of democratic decisionmaking. Political 
theorists have long grasped the importance of dissent to sound decisionmaking. 
Here I pull one analytic thread from this long line of analysis: the conventional 
Millian idea that dissent allows a society to test its views and positions, to 
assure itself of the accuracy of some views and to correct others. As Mill writes 
of the “peculiar evil of silencing the expression of [a dissenting] opinion,” we 
should treasure dissenting opinions both because “[i]f the opinion is right, [we] 
are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth; if wrong, [we] 
lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier 
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impression of truth produced by its collision with error.”42 In legal circles, of 
course, this argument generally travels under the rubric of the “marketplace of 
ideas.”43 
In order for dissent to function in the manner Mill envisioned, it must be 
visible. If would-be dissenters keep their views to themselves, their ideas will 
never reach the marketplace of ideas. The crucial question here is whether 
conventional dissent and dissenting by deciding produce different kinds of 
visibility for dissenting views. Below I explore that question, suggesting that 
they are different in Part II.A.1, and speculate as to why this difference might 
matter to our thinking about how best to institutionalize dissent in Part II.A.2. 
1. Making dissent visible: arguments versus decisions 
Acting moderately v. acting radically. It is not difficult to grasp the 
difference between dissenting by deciding (acting radically), on the one hand, 
and one variant of conventional dissent (acting moderately), on the other. 
Because dissenting by deciding takes the form of an outlier decision, not an 
argument, it is inherently visible to the polity.44 When conventional dissenters 
use their votes to gain concessions from the majority, in contrast, dissent is 
confined within the decisionmaking body. It takes the form of an argument to 
the majority of decisionmakers. It is quite visible to members of the majority, 
those whom the dissenters are lobbying or trying to convince. But at the 
aggregate level, while we might see the effects of conventional dissent—a 
slightly less mainstream decision, a concession or two for the out-group—the 
substance of the dissenters’ views is likely to remain opaque. 
 
42. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 16 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing 
Co. 1978) (1859). Mill was preceded, of course, by John Milton. See JOHN MILTON, 
AREOPAGITICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED PRINTING 14-16, 18-19, 32-34  
(W. Johnston ed.) (1644). 
43. Lamont v. Postmaster General of the U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 308 (1965); see also 
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (describing the 
importance of “the competition of the market”). See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREE 
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (1967); Emerson, General Theory, supra note 9; William P. 
Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. 
REV. 1 (1995); R. George Wright, A Rationale from J.S. Mill for the Free Speech Clause, 
1985 SUP. CT. REV. 149. For the views of the skeptics, see, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE 
SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 19-29 (1982); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First 
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Jerome A. Barron, Access to 
the Press—A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1967); Owen M. 
Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 787-88 (1987); Stanley Ingber, The 
Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984); Martin H. Redish, The 
Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of 
Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105 (1979). For an effort to distinguish the search for truth from 
the marketplace of ideas, see generally SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra note 2; SHIFFRIN, 
ROMANCE, supra note 2. 
44. As I explore infra note 67 and accompanying text, however, although the decision 
itself is public, the identity and commitments of the dissenters may not be. 
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Consider, for instance, the difference between a verdict rendered by a jury 
with one juror who is suspicious of prosecutorial misconduct and a decision to 
nullify by a jury filled with such jurors.45 Or imagine the likelihood that the 
policies of a school committee that includes a member of a left-leaning 
minority will make the left’s views visible compared to the likelihood that a 
committee dominated by left-leaning members will do so. To the extent that 
conventional dissenters choose to join the decision rather than distance 
themselves from it, policies may shift moderately, but dissent will be 
submerged at the polity-wide level. 
Acting radically v. speaking radically. The more interesting question is 
whether acting radically is different from speaking radically. Is dissenting by 
deciding different from publicizing a dissenting view, the other choice 
available to a conventional dissenter? After all, there are many avenues for 
making disagreement public that do not involve rendering a decision. Much of 
First Amendment doctrine, indeed, is preoccupied with preserving such 
avenues. Nonetheless, dissenting by deciding provides a type of visibility that 
may be hard to reproduce by publishing a dissenting opinion, let alone writing 
an editorial or answering a survey. Here again, there is a difference between 
dissent that takes the form of a decision and dissent that is expressed through an 
argument. 
Agenda setting. Dissenting by deciding has a direct political consequence: 
the decision of the dissenters is binding upon other members of the polity.46  
 
45. One might think that these observations would not apply to institutions governed 
by a unanimity rule, such as the jury. On this view, the only person who matters is the fringe 
voter, who can “hold out” and force the other jurors to acquiesce to her more extreme 
position. While voting rules plainly affect jural deliberations, group dynamics matter a great 
deal as well. Indeed, contrary to the intuition about hold-outs, “strong social-psychological 
evidence [suggests] that the pressure to conform [is] nearly irresistible when a single person 
[is] faced with a unanimous majority.” Phoebe C. Ellsworth, One Inspiring Jury, 101 MICH. 
L. REV. 1387, 1396 (2003). Thus, the jurors most likely to determine the outcome of a case 
are those at the “tipping point” of the jury, not those who hold the most extreme position in 
the group. For a summary of the empirical evidence regarding the tipping point in jury 
decisionmaking, identifying which jurors are likely to represent the counterpart to the swing 
voter, see, for example,  Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of 
Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622, 692 (2001) 
(finding different thresholds for acquittal and conviction, and challenging the traditional 
hypothesis that the critical threshold is the two-thirds mark); Robert J. MacCoun & Norbert 
L. Kerr, Asymmetric Influence in Mock Jury Deliberation: Jurors’ Bias for Leniency, 54 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 21 (1988) (examining the “asymmetry effect” in mock jury 
settings where juries operated under different standards of proof). For some empirical 
evidence regarding the complexity of group dynamics on the jury, see Devine, supra. For a 
discussion of the effect of voting rules on jury deliberations and verdicts, see, for example, 
id. at 669; Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Deliberative Lottery: A Thought Experiment in Jury 
Reform, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133 (1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED 
DISSENT 164-65 (2003). 
46. The binding effect may be only temporary. Such decisions can be—and often are—
overridden by the majority. 
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That fact may ensure it receives attention that conventional dissent might not. 
To be sure, speaking radically—publicizing disagreement—can have political 
consequences; it may, for instance, shame the majority into changing its 
position. Because conventional dissent lacks a binding legal effect, however, 
under many circumstances it will simply be ignored.   
Dissenting by deciding is harder to ignore because it takes the form of a 
decision rendered; getting rid of it generally means formally overruling it. 
Decisional dissent can thus force members of the majority to act, reevaluate, 
and engage with the decision and with those who made it.47 It thereby allows 
electoral minorities to engage in the type of agenda setting that is otherwise 
difficult for those outside the political mainstream.48 
One might argue that dissenting decisions can be ignored as well, at least 
when they resolve a sufficiently trivial issue. Decisions rendered by the town of 
Bolton, Massachusetts,49 or the Cambridge City Council are hardly the stuff of 
national debate. But the claim here is only that an outlier decision about even a 
trivial issue is less likely to be ignored than a published dissent to the 
majority’s preferred resolution of that trivial question. 
Certain groups, of course, are more than capable of making dissenting 
views visible without the aid of formal decisionmaking authority. The 
Democratic Caucus can easily make its position on an issue visible even when 
it does not control Congress. The NAACP or Common Cause can make their 
 
47. Here again, dissenting by deciding bears some resemblance to civil disobedience. 
See, e.g., King, supra note 35, at 291 (arguing that civil disobedience “seeks to create . . . a 
crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly refused to negotiate is 
forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize [an] issue that it can no longer be 
ignored”). For a comparison between civil disobedience and dissenting by deciding, see infra 
notes 89-95 and accompanying text.   
48. On agenda setting generally, see, for example, FRANK R. BAUMGARTEN & BRYAN 
D. JONES, AGENDAS AND INSTABILITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1993); ROGER W. COBB & 
CHARLES D. ELDER, PARTICIPATION IN AMERICAN POLITICS: THE DYNAMICS OF AGENDA-
BUILDING (1972); JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (2d. 
ed. 1984); WILLIAM H. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION 
BETWEEN THE THOERY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (Waveland Press 
1988). 
49. Bolton, however, made national headlines when a controversy erupted over the 
town’s piggeries. As Boston commuters began to move into the small farming town, some 
discovered that the seemingly pristine acreage they had purchased was downwind from 
Bolton’s odiferous pig farms. These newly minted Boltonites therefore tried to zone the pig 
farmers out of business, a strategy that resulted in a dramatic town meeting where the old 
townies and newcomers clashed. As with all great American stories, country wisdom—
which included the unimpeachable argument that “[i]f they win, it will be cows and sheep 
next”—triumphed over urban wiles. The story was picked up by numerous news outlets 
nationwide. See, e.g., Paul DellaValle, Bolton Voters Reject Ban on New Piggeries, BOSTON 
GLOBE, July 26, 1983; Paula Froke, It’s a Landslide ‘Oink’—Pigs Win the War, MIAMI 
HERALD, July 27, 1983, at A3; Hogtied—Mass. Town’s New Residents Want to Limit 
Piggeries, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 26, 1983, at A3;Town’s Farmers Defeat Forces Opposing 
Pigs, N. Y. TIMES, July 27, 1983, at A12. 
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members’ views clear to the world even if their supporters cannot muster 
enough votes to control any relevant governing institution. These groups are 
what I term “dissenting elites”; they lack the ability to control a majority of 
votes at the upper echelons of power, but they can still demand the majority’s 
attention.  Indeed, we might guess that electoral minorities are best able to 
make dissent visible at the upper echelons of power using conventional 
means—like state or national legislatures—where enough attention is paid to 
the debate to justify organizing a minority caucus.50   
Most would-be dissenters lack such power, however. Many individuals 
whose views are not represented by dissenting elites lack access to a 
sufficiently powerful institution to make their views public in this fashion. And 
even those citizens who share the views of dissenting elites nonetheless cannot 
themselves dissent effectively. When they voice the same arguments offered by 
the dissenting elites, no one pays attention.  Indeed, even if every dissenting 
school committee member or juror went to the trouble of penning her views, it 
is quite unlikely that anyone would take notice. The power associated with 
making a decision—acting with the authority of the state—provides a 
megaphone for amplifying the dissenting views of lower-level 
decisionmakers.51 
Dissenting by deciding, then, is an equalizer of sorts. It provides an avenue 
for average citizens to make disagreement visible. Because at least some of the 
opportunities for decisional dissent stem from the everyday participatory 
opportunities that allow a mass democracy to function, the coins of these 
realms are not money and access, but time and numbers. And even when 
average citizens are not on completely equal footing with dissenting elites—as 
with important positions in a local government, which demand something more 
of candidates than a mere willingness to participate—at the very least 
decisional dissent moves the debate closer to those at the lower end of the 
political hierarchy.52  
One might object that the power to decide is meaningless for dissenters as 
long as the centralized authority can overrule it. Who cares, for instance, if a 
locality adopts an ordinance protecting gay rights if the statewide majority can 
simply vote a different policy into place?53 Even when the majority overrules 
the dissenters, however, there is reason to think that the conversational dynamic 
 
50. In such contexts, conventional dissent may be the only option for dissenters. 
Absent adoption of proposals like those of Lani Guinier, see GUINIER, supra note 5, or a 
power-sharing agreement resembling a consociational democracy, it is very unlikely that 
electoral minorities will have a chance to make a decision when power is centralized, such as 
in a state or national legislature. 
51. For further exploration of this idea, see infra Part III.F. 
52. For instance, many officials who took part in the effort to marry gays and lesbians 
were county clerks, local commissioners, city council members, and mayors and deputy 
mayors of towns and small cities.  Robertson, supra note 40. 
53. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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between minority and majority plays out differently than it would in an arena 
featuring only conventional dissent.   
Specifically, dissenting by deciding may subtly shift the burden of 
persuasion in political discourse. When minorities dissent by deciding, we 
might expect to see something like an endowment effect or status quo bias.54 
There may be a stickiness to the initial decision that makes it more difficult for 
the majority to adopt its preferred policy than it would be were the majority 
operating with a clean slate. When the majority has already enacted a statewide 
rule, conventional dissenters bear the burden of persuasion if they want to 
change the status quo. When the minority gets a chance to put its principles into 
practice first, it may be more difficult for the majority to adopt its preferred 
rule.55  
The risks. Even if dissenting by deciding in some instances provides a 
more effective tool for agenda setting, that does not mean it is more effective in 
improving the quality of our decisions. Issues can get on the agenda too 
quickly. Forcing those in power to speak on an issue will not always further the 
dissenters’ cause. To the contrary, when dissenters force a response from the 
majority at too early a stage in the debate, they may generate a backlash that 
sets the dissenters’ goals back. In short, acting radically may get an issue taken 
off the table when speaking radically would not. 
Consider again San Francisco’s decision to marry gays and lesbians. That 
decision generated ripple effects that conventional expressions of dissent had 
never generated. It was not merely that the decision emboldened other 
jurisdictions in New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, and Oregon to follow 
suit.56 The decision also meant that attorneys general in other states had to 
decide whether to recognize those marriages.57 The California courts were 
 
54. See generally RICHARD THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE: PARADOXES AND 
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 63-78 (1992). The term endowment effect  “stands for the 
principal [sic] that people tend to value goods more when they own them than when they do 
not.” Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 
1228 (2003). Status quo bias is a broader term that refers to empirical evidence that 
“individuals tend to prefer the present state of the world to alternative states, all other things 
being equal.” Id. at 1228-29.    
55. For a survey of the legal scholarship that uses these insights from behavioral 
economics to predict that “once established, altering the legislative or regulatory status quo 
will be difficult” (as well as a cautionary note about the difficulties of drawing such 
inferences), see Korobkin, supra note 54, at 1242-55, 1266-70. Thanks to Bill Buzbee for 
suggesting this line of analysis. 
56. See Joshua Akers, Clerk Says She Was Doing Job by Issuing Licenses, 
ALBUQUERQUE J., June 15, 2004, at 1 (discussing the issuance of same-sex marriage licenses 
in New Mexico); David Von Drehle & Alan Cooperman, Same-Sex Marriage Vaulted Into 
Spotlight, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 2004, at A1 (discussing the political ramifications of issuing 
same-sex marriage licenses in New York, California, and Oregon); Thomas Crampton, 
Issuing Licenses, Quietly, to Couples in Asbury Park, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2004, at B5; Gay 
Marriage Chronology, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, May 16, 2004, at 4. 
57. See Dean E. Murphy, California Attorney General Is Pressed on Gay Marriage, 
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forced to decide whether the marriages were lawful. And elected officials 
across the country found it difficult to avoid taking a position on the issue 
because it was no longer merely a theoretical debate.58 
What we do not yet know is whether the decision of San Francisco (and 
Massachusetts) has furthered a cause or resulted in a backlash. On one view, 
the Democrats’ losses and the anti-gay marriage state initiatives passed during 
the 2004 election show that the localities went “too far, too fast.”59  On another 
view, there has been surprisingly little backlash to these marriage decisions. To 
be sure, when individuals were faced with an up-or-down vote on the issue, 
these initiatives passed by large margins. But what we did not see in the wake 
of these localities’ decision to marry gays and lesbians is massive protests or 
political mobilization signaling deep-seated anger. Further, contrary to the view 
of many pundits in the wake of the election, empirical analysis reveals that 
“gay marriage and abortion were far from the most important predictors of vote 
choice” and had “no effect” on the decisions of most voters, “even those in 
states with an anti-gay marriage initiative on the ballot.”60 On this view, the 
real-life instantiation of gay marriage has confirmed what we already knew—
that the majority of U.S. voters disagrees with the idea. But it also taught us 
something we did not know—where the gay marriage question falls in the 
majority’s list of national priorities. 
The point here, then, is not that dissenting by deciding is more likely to 
lead the majority to change its views. The point is simply that San Francisco’s 
example of decisional dissent has affected the political landscape differently 
than conventional dissent ever did. For good or for ill, the debate about gay 
marriage is different than it was eighteen months ago, and the notion of 
dissenting by deciding may help explain the democratic dynamic behind that 
fact. 
Remapping the politics of the possible. Even setting aside the possibility 
that a decision rather than an argument will lend more visibility to a dissenting 
view, there may be a difference in what, precisely, we end up seeing when 
dissent is couched in these competing forms. Dissent that takes the form of an 
argument takes on a distinctive, albeit familiar cast. When a minority caucus is 
 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A19 (describing the response to San Francisco’s decision). 
58. See id. (noting that Mayor Bloomberg of New York has staked out a position on 
the issue despite “[i]n the past . . . be[ing] more or less silent on the issue”). 
59. Dean E. Murphy, Some Democrats Blame One of Their Own, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 
2004, at A18 (quoting Senator Diane Feinstein); see Jeffrey Rosen, Immodest Proposal:  
Massachusetts Gets It Wrong on Gay Marriage, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003; Jeffrey 
Rosen, Kennedy Curse: On Sodomy, The Court Overreaches, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 21, 
2003; MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN AND LAWRENCE (AND GOODRIDGE) (Univ. Va. Legal 
Working Paper Series, Univ. Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Working 
Paper No. 16, Feb. 18, 2005), at http://law.bepress.com/uvalwps/uva_publiclaw/art16/ 
(arguing that Goodridge has resulted in a backlash against the gay-rights movement). 
60. Sunshine Hillygus & Todd Shields, Moral Issues and Voter Decision Making in the 
2004 Presidential Election, 38 PS: POL. SCI. AND POL. (forthcoming April 2005). 
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formed or a dissenting view is published, conventional dissenters can only 
announce their views in the abstract. All they can do is describe what members 
of their group would do if they had the power to decide. 
Dissenting by deciding offers a real-life instantiation of an idea. It thus 
allows electoral minorities to remap the politics of the possible. When dissent 
takes the form of decision, electoral minorities have a chance to put their ideas 
into practice, to move from abstract principles to actual policy.61 Decisional 
dissent gives us a concrete practice to examine, a real-world example to debate. 
We not only get to see whether the idea works, but how the new policy fits or 
clashes with existing institutional practices. Speaking radically thus looks 
different from acting radically.62 
Consider a set of examples drawn from Michael Klarman’s recent work on 
the Brown era.63  Klarman’s account offers examples of dissenting by deciding 
in its ugliest form (the resistance of white Southerners to a national court’s 
command to desegregate) and conventional dissent in its most heroic (the civil 
rights protests against the policies of southern state majorities). At first glance, 
one might think that Klarman tells the story of decisional dissent gone wrong. 
Klarman argues that the civil rights protests were the “primar[]y” reason that 
“the pace of school desegregation accelerated,”64 and no one needs to be 
reminded of the tragedies that arose from the actions of white Southerners who 
used the tools of governance to resist Brown’s mandate.  
As one peels back the layers, however, a more complex story emerges, one 
that illuminates the role dissenting by deciding can play in making 
disagreement visible. To begin, dissenting by deciding played a positive role in 
 
61. This argument finds some support in the federalism literature, in which a number 
of scholars have argued that one of the strengths of a federal system is that it allows states to 
become what Justice Brandeis termed “laborator[ies]” of democracy. New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
62. These observations, of course, are consistent with some of the justifications offered 
for standing doctrine by courts and commentators. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. 
Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (“[The 
specific injury requirement] tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court 
will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete 
factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.”); 
ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR 
OF POLITICS 115 (2d ed. 1986) (“[T]here are sound reasons, grounded not only in theory, but 
in the judicial experience of centuries, here and elsewhere, for believing that the hard, 
confining, and yet enlarging context of a real controversy leads to sounder and more 
enduring judgments.”);  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Justiciability, Remedies, and Public Law 
Litigation: Notes on the Jurisprudence of Lyons, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1984) (“A 
specific and concrete injury helps frame issues in a factual context suitable for judicial 
resolution.”); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221, 222 (1988) 
(stating that one of the “stated purposes of standing” is “that a concrete case informs the 
court of the consequences of its decisions”). 
63. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004). 
64. Id. at 360. 
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desegregation efforts, as it offered a real-life instantiation of what successful 
integration could look like. Klarman, for instance, finds that the success of 
local desegregation efforts in the border states—interracial educational 
committees and projects, an integrated teacher’s union, the desegregation of 
several local theaters and lunch counters—“smoothed the way for peaceful 
school desegregation.”65 In his words, “[t]he readiness of city and state 
officials to comply with Brown is therefore less surprising, given how far 
segregation barriers had already been breached.”66  
Klarman’s most controversial claim concerns the dark side of dissenting by 
deciding: that Brown radicalized Southern whites, leading them to acts of 
violence, which in turn transformed Northern opinion about the need for strong, 
national civil rights legislation.67  Here again, decisional dissent played a role, 
albeit a tragic one, in this dynamic. After all, had Southern whites merely 
confined themselves to conventional dissent, the nation might not have 
recognized the urgent need for civil rights legislation. The fact that southerners 
engaged not only in violence, but state-sponsored violence, offered concrete 
examples of what their outlier views looked like in practice. As Klarman 
observes, “[i]t was televised scenes of officially sanctioned brutality against 
black demonstrators that transformed northern opinion on race.”68     
Klarman’s account of the Brown era thus underlines Mill’s basic insight. 
When dissent is made visible, it sharpens our thinking about an issue. By 
offering a real-life instantiation of an idea, dissenting by deciding plainly 
furthers that end. It can sometimes show us that our views are mistaken, as 
Klarman suggests occurred when southern state majorities saw the results of 
incremental efforts to desegregate in the border states. And decisional dissent, 
like conventional dissent, can also produce “the clearer perception and livelier 
impression of truth produced by its collision with error.”69  To say this was the 
case with the nation’s reaction to the brutal resistance tactics deployed by white 
southerners would trivialize what occurred during those turbulent times. But if 
Klarman is correct that state-sponsored violence helped prompt an unduly 
complacent national majority to respond to southern intransigence, his account 
does shed light on the role that dissenting by deciding can play in making 
outlier views visible to the majority.  
The risks. The point, again, is not that a decision is a superior vehicle for 
conveying a dissenting view; it is simply a different one. Even setting aside the 
ugly costs of dissent, like the example described above, dissenting by deciding 
 
65. Id. at 345-46. 
66. Id. at 346; see also id. at 346-48. But see Paul Finkelman, Civil Rights in Historical 
Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973 (2005) (reviewing KLARMAN, id.). 
67. KLARMAN, supra note 63, ch. 7. 
68. Id. at 442. 
69. MILL, supra note 41, at 16. Steven Shiffrin makes a similar point about racist 
speech. See SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra  note 2, at 78. 
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will sometimes be a poor strategy for expressing dissent. In some instances, 
although the decision of the dissenters may be visible, the identity and 
commitments of the dissenters may not be. Jury verdicts, for instance, can be 
quite opaque.70  
Dissenting by deciding may also muddy—even change—the views of 
would-be dissenters. Most obviously, casting dissent in the form of a decision 
may prevent minorities from presenting their views in an analytically clean and 
comprehensive fashion. For instance, the choice for would-be dissenters may 
be binary—the acceptance or rejection of a given policy or verdict. Dissenters 
may not be able to articulate their views in full because the decision in question 
presents too limited a set of facts or policies to do so. Alternatively, the choice 
for would-be dissenters may involve too many options to make dissent visible. 
For instance, if we look at the record of a Democratic governor who holds 
power at a time when Republicans dominate national politics, how do we 
separate out the dissenting portions of her policy choices from the package of 
compromises and concessions that any governing official must make to do her 
job? 
Further, pouring dissent into the mold of a decision may change the 
contours of the idea. Theories often change when put into practice. 
Implementing an idea may require compromise and adaptation. It may reveal 
the need for even more systemic change or may prove ineffective in practice. 
Dissenting by deciding may be quite useful in this regard; dissenters may learn 
something different about their views, strengthen them through adaptation, or 
discover a more creative set of solutions to their concerns.71 But this strategy 
may also dilute or complicate the dissenters’ message in a way that undermines 
the effectiveness of their arguments. 
Finally, because those who dissent by deciding speak not on behalf of 
themselves, but on behalf of an institution, it may change the way the majority 
understands and responds to the dissenters’ position. On the one hand, when 
dissenters speak through an institutional channel, it may shift the debate from 
 
70. See Gerken, supra note 19, at 1168-69 (discussing these issues in greater detail). 
71. Consider, for instance, the remarkable path that those who want schools to teach 
creationism have taken. They have moved from demands that creationism be taught in the 
schools to a two-pronged attack on evolution. For a discussion of the intelligent design 
movement, see David K. DeWolf et al., Teaching the Origins Controversy: Science, or 
Religion, or Speech?, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 39, 59-61 (2000); Center for Science and Culture, 
Top Questions, http://www.discovery.org/csc/topQuestions.php (last visited Jan. 31, 2005) 
(describing the basic tenets of intelligent design theory). Proponents of teaching creationism 
have also appealed to traditional liberals with hard-to-resist claims that schools simply ought 
to teach students to think for themselves, thus requiring teachers to invite skepticism about 
the theory of evolution. See, e.g., Stephen Meyer, Commentary, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell in 
Biology Instruction, WASH. TIMES, July 4, 1996, at A13 (leading opponent of the theory of 
evolution claiming that “[t]he threat of indoctrination does not come from allowing students 
to ponder the philosophical issues raised by the origins question. Instead, it comes from 
force-feeding students a single ideological perspective.”). 
SSRN 3/25/2005 10:38 AM 
Month 20xx] DESKTOP PUBLISHING EXAMPLE 125 
the politics of identity to the politics of ideas.72 For instance, when San 
Francisco married gays and lesbians, did we understand the dissenters to be 
gays and lesbians or simply a majority of San Franciscans? On the other hand, 
there are risks to severing the link between identities and ideas. For instance, 
one might think it is a problem that the current stand-ins for the gay marriage 
debate are a heterosexual mayor from the West Coast and a heterosexual judge 
on the East Coast. Such stand-ins allow would-be opponents of the dissenters’ 
position to avoid railing against the dissenters or even their idea, but to 
complain about institutional actors’ exceeding their authority.73 
2. Comparing institutional alternatives: Sunstein and the dynamics of  
democratic decisionmaking 
Once we understand the difference between the type of visibility afforded 
by conventional dissent and dissenting by deciding, the question is when we 
would choose one strategy for institutionalizing dissent over another if we 
subscribe to Mill’s view that dissent can improve our decisionmaking. The 
analysis above suggests that this assessment will turn largely on context—what 
level of decisionmaking are we describing? Will the dissenters’ message be 
muddied if it is channeled through a governance decision or corrupted if it is 
channeled through state action? Would a concrete instantiation of the 
dissenters’ view make it more visible? Are there such severe costs associated 
with decisional dissent, as with the Brown example, that the game is not worth 
the candle?  
A useful way to ground the analysis may be to consider an alternative 
method for advancing the Millian aim of improving decisionmaking: Cass 
Sunstein’s recent work on the dynamics of dissent.74 Because Sunstein’s work 
draws upon the Millian tradition and focuses on specifying mechanisms for 
institutionalizing dissent, it provides a useful example for thinking about the 
role dissenting by deciding might play in furthering the aims of dissent. 
The dynamics of decisionmaking—conformity, polarization, and 
cascades—and the appropriate institutional cure. Sunstein identifies three 
decisionmaking pathologies where dissent may provide a needed corrective: 
conformity, polarization, and cascades.75 Conformity refers to the human 
tendency to do what everyone else is doing. The presence of a dissenter, say, on 
a corporate board or in an investment group can reduce the pressure to conform 
and thus free individuals on a decisionmaking body to share information or 
challenge the wisdom of a particular course of action. Polarization takes place 
when a group of people who agree upon an outcome reinforce each other’s 
 
72. See ANNE PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF PRESENCE 1 (1995). 
73. I am indebted to Dan Weiner for helpful conversation on these points. 
74.  SUNSTEIN, supra note 29. 
75. Id. at 10-11 (defining all three terms). 
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views during the decisionmaking process. As a result, the group takes a more 
extreme position than one would predict given its members’ predeliberation 
tendencies.76 Cascades involve conformity over time; a set of decisionmakers 
makes a choice and subsequent decisionmakers, influenced by the apparent 
agreement of the first movers, make the same choice even if they would have 
not reached such a decision independently.77 
A recognition of the differences between conventional dissent and 
dissenting by deciding suggests that the phenomena Sunstein identifies may 
require different institutional cures. Conventional dissent—which is achieved 
by the presence of one or more potential dissenters on every decisionmaking 
body—seems the natural cure for conformity and polarization. The presence of 
one or more dissenters in every group seems likely to reduce the chances that 
the group will reach the “wrong” decision.  
Dissenting by deciding, however, may be necessary to avoid cascades. If 
cascades stem from the unanimity among the decisions of first movers, an 
outlier decision seems like the most effective strategy for eliminating the 
appearance of consensus. It seems to provide the right kind of visibility for the 
dissenters’ view.   
Indeed, it seems at least theoretically possible that, by destroying the 
appearance of unanimity in decisions rendered, dissenting by deciding may 
even help the dissenters with whom Sunstein is primarily occupied—the 
minorities within a decisionmaking body—to “screw [their] courage to the 
sticking place”78 and speak up. After all, if conformity by individuals stems 
from the perception that everyone else thinks differently, dissenting by 
deciding at least makes clear that others hold the same outlier view as the 
would-be dissenter. 
To put these concepts in more concrete terms, consider how these 
phenomena play out in the context of Sunstein’s example of appellate panels. 
Sunstein argues that, given the important role dissent plays in helping people to 
get the right answer in a group decisionmaking process, each appellate panel 
would ideally include a judge who has been nominated by a different party than 
that which nominated the other judges sitting on the panel. His proposal would 
mean that each panel would contain either two judges nominated by Democrats 
and one nominated by a Republican, or two Republican nominees and one 
Democratic nominee. Sunstein, in other words, seeks conventional dissent on 
appellate panels.79 
From the perspective of individual cases, one might think this proposal is 
all to the good. If we are worried about conformity or polarization, Sunstein’s 
proposal is an excellent one. It would reduce the likelihood that group members 
 
76. Id. at 11.  
77. Id. at 10-11. 
78. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MACBETH, act 1, sc. 7. 
79. SUNSTEIN, supra note 29, at 166-193. 
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would goad one another into a more extreme position than the group’s 
members’ predeliberation views would suggest. 
If we are worried about cascades, however, we would probably want to 
encourage decisions that embody a dissenting view. If an outlier decision is our 
goal, it is not clear that we want a system in which each appellate panel 
includes someone from the other party. What we might lose under such a plan 
is dissent visible at the aggregate level—a decision that embodies the 
dissenting or outlier view—which would eliminate the appearance of consensus 
and short-circuit the cascade. If cascades are our biggest concern, it may be 
useful to have the perspective that an “ideologically amplified” decision made 
by an all-Democratic nominee or all-Republican nominee panel would 
provide.80 
The trade-off between conventional and decisional dissent. The notions of 
conventional dissent and dissenting by deciding also suggest a trade-off 
embedded in the choice we make about the appropriate mechanism for 
institutionalizing dissent. The two strategies can, of course, coexist—even 
complement one another—within a democratic scheme. Nonetheless, this 
framing device suggests that it may not always be possible to foster both types 
of dissent simultaneously within the same institution. At least within a given 
institution, there is a trade-off between conventional dissent and dissenting by 
deciding: decisional dissent may reduce the risk of cascades but increase the 
risk of conformity or polarization, and conventional dissent may reduce the risk 
of conformity or polarization while increasing the risk of cascades. 
Specifically, if we seek dissent on every decisionmaking body (to avoid the 
dangers of conformity or polarization), we must spread dissenters out across 
decisionmaking bodies rather than concentrating them in a few. These bodies 
are therefore likely to be roughly similar in their composition—and thus likely 
to render a roughly similar set of moderate decisions. Cascades, of course, 
occur precisely in such circumstances—when there appears to be an emerging 
consensus among the first movers. If cascades are the concern, in contrast, we 
would want to give dissenters control over some decisionmaking bodies, 
reducing their numbers elsewhere but fostering occasional outlier decisions. 
That strategy, of course, precludes the presence of dissenters on every 
decisionmaking body and thus increases the likelihood that conformity or 
polarization will occur in some places. Put differently, politically homogenous 
decisionmaking bodies—the ones most likely to be plagued by conformity or 
polarization—are likely to produce visible dissent in the system as a whole, and 
politically heterogeneous groupings submerge dissent at the aggregate level and 
thus create the risk of cascades. 
Consider again Sunstein’s proposal to ensure that every appellate panel 
contains at least one judge nominated by the other party. Consistent with the 
 
80. Id. at 179. 
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empirical evidence, we would expect the decisions those panels render to be 
relatively homogenous, as the presence of the Republican nominee would 
moderate the decision rendered by the otherwise all-Democratic-nominated 
panel, and the presence of the Democratic nominee would moderate the 
decision rendered by an otherwise Republican-nominated panel.81 Designing 
appellate panels to produce a more moderate set of decisions creates the risk of 
what Sunstein terms a “precedential cascade,” where subsequent appellate 
panels follow the lead of the initial panels in ruling on a question.82 Subsequent 
appellate panels—or the Supreme Court—might be less likely to depart from 
the “moderate” view than they would be if the set of appellate decisions on a 
given issue varied. Dissenting by deciding (in the form of an “ideologically 
amplified” decision), then, would be useful to offset the precedential cascade 
that seems likely to take place were all appellate decisions to resemble one 
another.83 
In sum, the notion of dissenting by deciding suggests a trade-off embedded 
in the dynamics of dissent: guaranteeing dissent within individual 
decisionmaking bodies may systematically submerge dissent within the system 
as a whole. It may be precisely when dissent flourishes at the 
intraorganizational level—when it takes the form of conventional dissent—that 
 
81. Sunstein terms this phenomenon “ideological dampening.” Id. at 167. 
82. Id. at 59. Sunstein suggests that dissenting opinions may serve that role. In order to 
answer that question in this context, we would want to know whether dissents are more 
moderate when written for a mixed panel and whether, in the presence of significant 
agreement among two-judge panels, dissenting opinions will constitute effective dissents in 
light of the arguments sketched above. For instance, does the label “dissent” undermine the 
ability of a dissenting opinion to short-circuit a cascade? See Heather Gerken, Dissent, 
Diversity, and the Global Polity, in LEGISLATURES AND CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE ROLE OF 
THE LEGISLATURE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE (Kahana et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2005). 
83. In one respect, the example of appellate panels is an unfortunate one for purposes 
of this paper, as it suggests that decisional dissent comes from homogenous bodies of would-
be dissenters. While it is certainly true that homogeneous decisionmaking bodies—those 
consisting solely of would-be dissenters—would generate visibility, my assumption is that 
visibility can also be generated as a general matter by decisionmaking bodies that are simply 
dominated by would-be dissenters. Thus, as I discuss below, infra Part III.E, the point of 
decisional dissent as a general matter is not to create decisionmaking bodies that exclude 
members of the majority, but simply to create decisionmaking bodies that minority group 
members dominate. Indeed, many of the values associated with dissenting by deciding 
demand the presence of majority group members on the decisionmaking body. See infra Part 
III.E. The analysis above is based on the assumption that, because appellate panels (1) 
contain only three members, and (2) are drawn from a fairly narrow stratum of the 
population, we would see much less variation from a minority-dominated appellate panel 
(with two members nominated by the minority party and one nominated by the majority 
party) than we would from a minority-dominated body that contains many members and is 
drawn from a broader swath of the population. That is, my assumption is that even a 
minority-dominated, non-ideologically amplified panel—where two judges appointed by the 
minority party moderate their decisions due to the presence of a third judge appointed by the 
majority party—is not going to render a decision that is significantly different from majority-
dominated, non-ideologically amplified panels. 
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dissent visible at the interorganizational or aggregate level would be sorely 
missed. 
This analysis suggests an interesting dilemma for electoral minorities: 
whether it is better to seek conventional or decisional dissent in situations 
where cascades are likely to occur. Conventional dissent among first-movers 
should increase the likelihood of a cascade. But it will also help moderate the 
set of decisions that triggers that cascade, so the uniform answer produced by 
the cascade will be a moderate one. Dissenting by deciding among first-movers 
may short-circuit or postpone a cascade. But if it fails to do so, electoral 
minorities may have lost the chance to moderate the decisions that ultimately 
become the consensus choice. 
Nor is this trade-off solely a concern for electoral minorities; it also matters 
for those seeking productive strategies for institutionalizing dissent and thereby 
improving democratic decisionmaking more generally. After all, while we can 
imagine that some cascades are likely to be fruitful ones,84 we can also assume 
that first-movers will not always reach the “right” answer (or at least not the 
“right” answer for subsequent adopters). Encouraging dissenting by deciding—
differences in policy perspectives that are visible at the aggregate level—may 
serve an important purpose. It offers decisionmaking bodies a wider menu of 
models for appropriate choices, thereby allowing them to adopt a set of policies 
or principles that are tailored to their individual needs and forestalling or 
minimizing the harms potentially associated with a decisionmaking cascade. 
Finally, it is worth reemphasizing how much context is likely to matter in 
making these assessments. Sunstein’s work on dissent is useful for purposes of 
this paper because it presents these questions in a particularly crisp way; it 
filters out the identity of the dissenters, the size of the dissenting group, and a 
variety of institutional features that might be crucial for our assessment of 
whether conventional dissent or dissenting by deciding is preferable. Moreover, 
although cascades are much more prevalent than most of us think,85 using 
cascades as an example places a thumb on the scale of this debate. A cascade is 
an example where formal power—the ability to issue a decision—takes on 
great significance. The example used here may thus obscure other values 
associated with visibility that would favor conventional dissent—for instance, 
the importance of presenting one’s views in a comprehensive and 
uncompromised fashion, without the potential for distortion or obfuscation that 
may be associated with dissent channeled through a decision. 
 
84. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks, for instance, have explored how to harness 
cascades in the service of promoting international human rights. See Ryan Goodman & 
Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,  
54 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2004); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Toward an Institutional 
Theory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1749 (2003). 
85. For a description of the surprising prevalence of cascades in the decisions of 
nation-states and state and local governments, see Gerken, supra note 77. 
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B. Dissent and the Value of Self-Governance: Speaking Truth to Power or With 
It 
A second reason we value dissent is that it encourages the participation of 
minorities in the project of self-governance.86 The link between the First 
Amendment and the values associated with self-governance has been the 
subject of much academic discussion. The seminal work is that of Alexander 
Meiklejohn, who argued that “human discourse, as the First Amendment sees 
it, is not ‘a mere academic and harmless discussion.’. . . It offers defense to 
men who plan and advocate and incite toward cooperative action for the 
common good.”87  
In thinking about the ways in which dissent furthers the project of self-
governance, a number of scholars have emphasized the importance of dissent 
for engaging electoral minorities—the usual losers in the political process—in 
 
86. Alexander Meiklejohn has written the seminal work on the relationship between 
speech and self-governance. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION 
TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1948). 
Contemporary scholars of many stripes have similarly explored the governance 
underpinnings of the First Amendment. See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 
(1996); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993); Lillian 
R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and 
Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 300-01 (1978); Robert H. Bork, Neutral 
Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 27 (1971); Owen M. Fiss, 
Why the State?, 100 HARV. L. REV. 781, 788 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social 
Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1416 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 255, 316 (1992). For critiques of Meiklejohn, see ROBERT C. POST, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 269-89; FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL 
INQUIRY 41 (1982); Robert Post, Meiklejohn’s Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform 
of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993); Frederick Schauer, The Role of the 
People in First Amendment Theory, 74 CAL. L. REV. 761, 778-80 (1986); Zechariah Chafee, 
Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949). 
 It is worth noting, however, that the arguments below only loosely follow this line of 
scholarship. Meiklejohn and those inspired by his approach are generally concerned with the 
role free speech plays in educating citizens about the decisions they must make and creating 
appropriate conditions for democratic deliberation. They typically focus on the 
decisionmaker in her role as listener. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM supra, at 
24 (“What is essential is not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall 
be said.”). The analysis below is in some ways orthogonal to this set of concerns, as its focus 
is not on preparing the citizen to decide, but on the decision itself. 
87. Id. at 42; see also JED RUBENFELD, FREEDOM AND TIME 69 (2001) (criticizing the 
speech model of self-government because “the self that was to govern itself was the 
individual, not the people”); Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, supra note 86, at 1409-
10. This part similarly picks up on critiques of “expressivist” theories of voting, which 
privilege self-expression as the purpose of casting a ballot. Jeremy Waldron, for instance, 
argues that “expressivist accounts of the importance of participation convey the misleading 
impression that the substance of politics—the decisions to be made and their implications for 
real people—matters less than the catharsis, the righteous sense of commitment, and the 
agonistic flair involved in publicly identifying a particular view as one’s own.” JEREMY 
WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 240 (1999); see also JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: 
STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 99 (1983). 
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the project of self-rule. Dissent matters for these purposes because a 
government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the minority depends in part on its 
creation of channels for dissent. Stephen Carter, for example, has argued that 
“the decision on how to treat disobedience is . . . part of the community’s act of 
definition,”88 adding that: 
[f]or the fairness and decency of any state should be assessed not alone 
through study of whether its majorities . . . find it good, but through a study of 
whether its minorities . . . find it good. Another way to look at the matter is 
this: the justice of a state is not measured by its authority’s tolerance for 
dissent, but also by its dissenters’ tolerance for authority.”89 
Similarly, Steven Shiffrin has argued that protecting the rights of dissenters to 
protest helps bind them to the political community,90 and Lee Bollinger 
describes the shared intuition that the “society adds something important to its 
identity, that it is significantly strengthened, by . . . acts of extraordinary 
tolerance” toward dissenters.91 
If we value dissent because it encourages electoral minorities to take part in 
the project of governance, the question is whether conventional dissent and 
dissenting by deciding further that end in different ways. Is there a reason to 
think that speaking truth with power might affect electoral minorities 
differently than speaking truth to power? I explore possible reasons for 
reaching this conclusion in Part II.B.1, and I compare competing strategies for 
creating avenues for decisional dissent in Part II.B.2. 
1. Forging civic ties 
If we value dissent in part because it helps cement ties between electoral 
minorities and the polity, it is easy to grasp the arguments in favor of 
conventional dissent. If the state creates opportunities for contestation—a 
chance for dissenters to have their say—electoral minorities will feel they have 
gotten a “fair shake.”92 Further, giving dissenters a chance to participate in the 
 
88. STEPHEN  L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED 86 (1998) 
89. Id. at 97. 
90. See Emerson, General Theory, supra note 9, at 885 (lauding free speech because it 
enhances the legitimacy of policy decisions, as “persons who have had full freedom to state 
their positions and to persuade others . . . will . . . be more ready to accept the common 
judgment”); SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra note 43, at 18.  
91. LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY 9 (1986). 
92. See Philip Pettit, Republican Freedom and Contestatory Democratization, in 
DEMOCRACY’S VALUE 163 (Ian Shapiro & Casiano Hacker-Cordón eds., 1999). Pettit, it 
should be noted, makes these arguments in a slightly different context, discussing the need to 
grant electoral minorities the opportunity to challenge the law in an acceptably neutral 
process—such as a proceeding before a judge, a jury, or an administrative agency—and 
thereby to vindicate what he terms a “contestatory” or “oppositional” model of democracy. 
Id. at 183-85. His conception of dissent focuses more on elites and less on a populist 
conception in which the people speak for themselves. 
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decision and to air their disagreements publicly can both be understood as an 
acknowledgment by the majority of the dignity of the dissenter. 
Participation versus power. Dissenting by deciding may go one step 
further in forging ties between dissenter and the polity. It offers electoral 
minorities not only the dignity to participate, but the dignity to decide. If 
scholars are correct that protecting dissent in its conventional form helps bind 
dissenters to the community, then granting dissenters a chance to decide—to 
speak truth with power—may give would-be dissenters an even stronger reason 
to be invested in the system, a significant justification for calling it their own. 
Decisional dissent allows electoral minorities to shed the role of powerless 
critic. Rather than merely cast a vote, electoral minorities wield the same power 
and authority as members of the majority. Dissenters, too, get a chance to “take 
turns standing in for the whole.”93 
The relationship between personal and civic identity. Conventional dissent 
and dissenting by deciding also seem to suggest a different relationship 
between a dissenter’s views and her civic status. The conventional model of 
dissent, as noted above, leaves a would-be dissenter two choices: act 
moderately or speak radically. If a dissenter wishes to engage directly in self-
rule—to act under the authority of the state—she must speak moderately. If she 
wishes to speak her mind, giving full expression to her views, she necessarily 
distances herself from the project of self-governance. She speaks for herself, 
not for the state.94 Conventional dissent may thus be more likely to create a 
disconnect between an individual’s identity as a dissenter and her status as a 
member of the polity. Disagreement with the majority’s view is, in some 
senses, equated with disagreement with the polity. 
Decisional dissent, in contrast, blends dissent with an act of governance. 
 
93. George Kateb, The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, 91 ETHICS 
357, 360 (1981). Kateb uses this phrase to describe the notion that in a representative 
democracy, a party or faction that does not represent all the people temporarily wields power 
on the entire polity’s behalf. Kateb’s description also applies to disaggregated institutions 
(like juries) where coalitions of citizens participate seriatim rather than elect someone to act 
on their behalf. Here, however, as I explore below, infra Part III.D, we sometimes 
understand the part to be standing in for the whole, and we sometimes understand these 
institutions to render decisions for only part of the whole. For further exploration of the idea 
of standing in for the whole and its connection to democratic politics, see LANI GUINIER & 
GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY: ENLISTING RACE, RESISTING POWER, 
TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 168-222 (2002) (exploring the notion of synecdoche in the 
context of race and redistricting). 
94. To be sure, while speaking radically distances dissenters from the decision of the 
majority, dissenters who choose instead to act moderately—to use their votes to gain 
concessions from the majority—allow dissenters to affiliate with the polity. But at the 
moment the dissenters act under the authority of the state, they act moderately. They are no 
longer expressing disagreement; they are compromising their position in order to join the 
decision. They give up on their opposition in exchange for the majority’s concessions. The 
dissent piece to their involvement drops out, in a sense. Dissenting by deciding, in contrast, 
allows dissenters to act radically—to oppose the majority even as they issue a decision. 
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When an individual can dissent by deciding, she is able to reaffirm her status as 
a full member of the polity at the same moment she expresses her disagreement 
with the majority’s view. Dissent involves both an act of affiliation and an act 
of contestation. 
One might argue, correctly, that conventional dissent can also be 
understood as an act of affiliation. A conventional dissenter can, of course, 
declare her affiliation with the polity—her loyalty to the political community—
at the same moment she expresses her disagreement.95 The relevant difference 
between conventional and decisional dissent, however, is that the state in some 
senses returns the sentiment. When someone dissents by deciding, her act of 
affiliation is officially recognized as such—“blessed,” if you will, by the state. 
The dissenter does not merely declare her affiliation to the state; she acts under 
its authority despite staking out an outlier position. Membership from the polity 
is distinguished from membership in the majority—not merely as a matter of 
rhetoric, as is possible with conventional dissent, but as a matter of institutional 
practice. 
On this view, dissenting by deciding fits more clearly with Michael 
Walzer’s view of how we should understand at least one form of dissent. 
Walzer argues that civil disobedience—a particularly strong form of dissent 
that shares some of the characteristics of decisional dissent—stems from the 
problem of overlapping membership: “when obligations incurred in some small 
group come into conflict with obligations incurred in a larger, more inclusive 
group, generally the state.”96 Someone engaged in civil disobedience, Walzer 
believes, has only “partial claims” against the state;97 his “loyalties are 
divided,” as “he is not in any simple sense a citizen” or a rebel,98 but partially 
both, precisely because “the processes through which men incur obligations are 
unavoidably pluralistic.”99 Civil disobedience merely stems from the existence 
of overlapping memberships, and “there is considerable evidence to suggest 
that the state can live with, even if it chooses not to accommodate, groups with 
partial claims against itself.”100 
Dissenting by deciding can be understood as an instantiation of the practice 
of pluralism, at least on Walzer’s view; as with Walzer’s account of civil 
disobedience, dissenting by deciding allows citizens to engage in partial 
rebellion and thus “builds loyalty not only toward the state but also against 
it.”101 Unlike conventional dissent, dissenting by deciding does not demand an 
 
95. See infra note 111 (discussing Kalven’s description of civil rights protesters). 
96. MICHAEL WALZER, OBLIGATIONS: ESSAYS ON DISOBEDIENCE, WAR, AND 
CITIZENSHIP 10 (1970). 
97. Id. at 14. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. at 15. 
100. Id. at 11-12. 
101. Id. at 220. 
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external emigration to accompany what Walzer terms the “internal emigration” 
of a dissenter.102 A dissenter can speak for the state, like any other citizen, even 
when she speaks her mind.  
Absorbing the habits of citizenship. Dissenting by deciding may also 
inculcate the habits of self-governance in would-be dissenters differently than 
conventional dissent. Conventional dissent, to be sure, teaches the value of 
compromise to those dissenters who choose to act moderately and the value of 
opposition to those who speak radically. The participatory habits conventional 
dissenters are likely to acquire are thus those of the influencer or gadfly. 
If conventional dissent offers a rough choice between self-rule and self-
expression, dissenting by deciding fuses the two. The goal of the dissenter is 
not just to win a concession or shame the majority, but to get something—her 
something—done. Dissenting by deciding represents an unusual blend of the 
liberty of the ancients (a participatory conception of citizenship) and the liberty 
of the moderns (self-expression, an individual-centered conception of liberty 
that requires protection from government interference).103 Harry Kalven’s 
suggestion that the “citizen-critic” is “our most important public official”104 
ceases to be a metaphor. For instance, Greens who dominate a zoning board are 
not merely touting a contrary view about the current state of the environment; 
they are working to integrate those views into the political system. A school 
committee figuring out how to teach creationism is not just offering a critique 
of secular education; its members are embracing that educational system as 
their own and doing their best to improve it.  
It is worth noting that electoral minorities take on not just the power 
associated with membership in the majority, but the responsibility. Dissenters 
no longer enjoy the luxury of the critic: inaction. They must figure out how to 
put their ideas into practice, negotiate a compromise and, most importantly, live 
with the consequences of their critique. A jury filled with those who think our 
sentencing regime is unduly punitive must set a guilty defendant free in a case 
where the victim is more than a cipher. A zoning commission filled with pro-
environmentalists will be forced to vote against worthy projects to protect the 
environment. A school committee that believes creationism should be taught in 
the school must choose a textbook, figure out precisely how to integrate those 
arguments with the school’s science curriculum, and decide how to 
accommodate the views of those who think creationism does not belong in the 
school. 
Trade-offs, risks, and benefits. Here again, dissenting by deciding is merely 
a different strategy for promoting dissent, not necessarily a better one. To 
 
102. Id. at 14. 
103. See Benjamin Constant, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That of the 
Moderns, in CONSTANT: POLITICAL WRITINGS 307 (Biancamaria Fontana trans. & ed., 1988).  
104. Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on ‘The Central Meaning of the 
First Amendment” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 205.  
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begin, there is an obvious trade-off embedded in the choice between decisional 
and conventional dissent. We must decide  how broad or how deep we want 
minority influence to run in our institutions. Within a given institutional setting, 
we must choose between allowing electoral minorities to participate in all 
decisions or to control some of them. After all, if we want to ensure that 
electoral minorities have the power to decide, we must concentrate them in 
some subset of decisionmaking bodies, thus sacrificing a chance for them to 
influence the decisions made by each of those bodies. Dissenting by deciding 
also carries its own set of possibilities and risks. For instance, on the one hand, 
we might value the chance to strengthen the ties between the dissenter’s private 
identity and her civic one. In the long run, if disagreement is consistently 
embraced as a public act rather than shunted off to the private realm, it may 
help us think of dissent as an everyday act of citizenship rather than as an act of 
disaffiliation.  
On the other hand, dissenting by deciding may blur the public-private 
distinction that many think is crucial for maintaining political pluralism. 
Political pluralists argue that individuals are members of multiple social groups 
that serve, in effect, as sources of sovereignty that are independent of—and in 
competition with—the state.105 In the words of Dalia Tsuk, “[b]y envisioning 
sovereignty as distributive or multiple, pluralists sought to guarantee the 
flourishing of diverse and valuable forms of identities, ways of life, 
experiences, and viewpoints.”106 Political pluralists have been especially 
attentive to protecting private groups and associations from public interference 
and thus preserving their ability to serve as competing sources of norms. 
Kathleen Sullivan offers a typical argument to this effect in discussing the 
constitutional status of religious groups: 
One might think such autonomy for religious and other private associations 
desirable precisely because of the normative pluralism and epistemic diversity 
it fosters. To the extent that religion serves as an autonomous source of values 
for its members, it stands apart from and potentially against the state . . . . On 
 
105. See, e.g., MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
159 (1999); CAROLD WEISBROD, EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE 
STATE 112 (2002); William A. Galston, Expressive Liberty and Constitutoinal Democracy: 
The Case of Freedom of Conscience, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 149, 150 (2003); William A. Galston, 
Expressive Liberty, Moral Pluralism, Political Pluralism: Three Sources of Liberal Theory, 
40 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 869, 881 (1999); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Constitutionalizing 
Women’s Equality, 90 CAL. L. REV. 735, 755 (2002); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The New 
Religion and the Constitution, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1397, 1401 (2003); Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Sex, Money, and Groups: Free Speech and Association Decisions in the October 1999 Term, 
28 PEPP. L. REV. 723, 743 (2001); Dalia Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor: The Politics of 
Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1876-77 (2003); Dalia Tsuk, The New 
Deal Origins of American Legal Pluralism, 29 FL. ST. U. L. REV. 189, 201 (2001); Mark 
Tushnet, The Emerging Principle of Accommodation of Religion (Dubitante), 76 GEO. L.J. 
1691, 1699-1700 (1988); Carol Weisbrod, Practical Polyphony: Theories of the State and 
Feminist Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV. 985, 1002 (1990). 
106. Tsuk, Corporations Without Labor, supra note 105, at 1876-77. 
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this view, public and private values ought not be congruent, and conscription 
of private associations, including religious associations, into common norms 
and public values defeats their very purpose.107 
Dissenting by deciding seems to pose a quite different threat to political 
pluralism than the one most pluralists imagine emanating from the state. 
Whereas political pluralists tend to worry that the state will impose its own 
public values on private groups,108 dissenting by deciding could lead to the 
absorption of private values into the public realm. Dissenting by deciding poses 
the risk of cooptation—the gradual erosion of the public-private boundary 
through the state’s embrace of, rather than assault upon, dissenting views. 
Even if dissenting by deciding does not unduly erode public-private 
boundaries, there is a risk that dissenting by deciding may, in the long run, 
tame dissent. To be sure, one might initially think that the fact that dissent takes 
the form of a decision might make it more threatening—acting radically may 
be more disturbing to the majority than speaking radically. Dissenting by 
deciding may harden the majority’s views against dissenters if it creates the 
appearance that dissenters are hijacking the state’s apparatus to express 
disagreement. 
Further, channeling dissent through accepted political channels might 
initially seem to strengthen the hand of dissenters. Dissenting by deciding may 
seem more respectable than conventional dissent—more like governance and 
less like politics. It may move dissent closer to Edward Corbett’s view that 
disagreement ought to be expressed through “the rhetoric of the open hand” 
rather than that of “the closed fist.”109 Harry Kalven, for example, noted the 
power of dissent when it is connected to a reaffirmation of one’s membership 
in the community. He describes the genius of civil-rights protests that 
“symbolized . . . a deep grievance, not a break with the society. [Protesters] 
prayed, they pledged allegiance to the flag, they sang ‘God Bless America,’ 
and—in [one instance]—they even stopped for a red traffic light.”110 These 
acts of affiliation during the moment of dissent helped protestors, to borrow a 
phrase Kalven uses elsewhere, “trap democracy in its own decencies.”111 As 
 
107. Sullivan, The New Religion, supra note 105, at 1401. 
108. See id. 
109. Edward P. J. Corbett, The Rhetoric of the Open Hand and the Rhetoric of the 
Closed Fist, in DISSENT: SYMBOLIC BEHAVIOR AND RHETORICAL STRATEGIES 71, 71 (Haig A. 
Bosmajian ed., 1972). Corbett uses the metaphor to contrast dissent through “reasoned, 
sustained, conciliatory discussion” rather than the “non-rationale, non-sequential, often non-
verbal, frequently provocative” protest that he believes characterized protests during the 
1960s. Id. Charles Fried has pursued a similar set of ideas in describing judicial dissents as 
either “collaborative” or “oppositional.” Charles Fried, Five to Four: Reflections on the 
School Voucher Case, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 180 (2002). Of course, one might also think 
that decisional dissent is more like Corbett’s closed fist; it takes the form of a decision, an 
act of power, rather than an argument. 
110. HARRY KALVEN, THE NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1965). 
111. Id. at 67. The lessons Kalven draws from civil rights protests has apparently not 
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noted above,112 dissenting by deciding goes one step further, as the dissenters’ 
act of affiliation is officially recognized as such by the state. 
In the long run, however, decisional dissent may tame dissent by 
channeling contestation into a form that is more palatable to the majority. 
Conventional dissent, as noted above, involves an argument against the polity’s 
decision. Its dominant valence is oppositional. Dissenting by deciding, in 
contrast, encourages dissenters to work through the system. Rather than jeering 
from the sidelines, dissenters suit up and get in the game. Further, their 
disagreement seems to take a positive form—an affirmative effort to put their 
views into the service of the state—rather than a negative attack on the policies 
of the majority. And it provides ready institutional channels for dissenters to 
blow off steam,113 perhaps leading them to vent their frustrations by making 
small decisions rather than organize to change the larger ones. 
Further, in some instances, it may be easier to speak truth without power. 
Channeling dissent through accepted channels of governance risks diluting 
dissent. The rhetoric of the closed fist can be more powerful than that of the 
open hand; outsiders may be more effective at generating change than insiders. 
Expressing dissent through accepted channels of governance risks taming 
dissent, cabining it within bounds that are acceptable to the majority. Precisely 
because dissenters are engaged in governance, they cannot present their ideas in 
an undiluted form, but must engage in the same sort of compromise and 
negotiation that members of the majority do when they seek to implement their 
own preferences. If dissent always took this form, it might pressure dissenters 
to accommodate the majority’s views rather than challenge them.  Further, the 
presence of dissenters in positions of power might “bless” the process, lending 
the government an undeserved legitimacy in the eyes of the minority and 
majority. 
2. Comparing institutional alternatives: federalism 
If we think there are values associated with dissenting by deciding, the 
obvious question is how best to preserve channels for its exercise? The First 
Amendment, of course, has long been used as a tool to create and preserve 
avenues for dissent that takes a conventional form. But we lack a 
 
been lost on the Mayor of San Francisco, whose staff “made sure that when the mayor came 
out swinging against Bush’s backing for a constitutional amendment banning same-sex 
marriage, he was standing in front of an American flag.” Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, 
Newsom Hasn’t Been Ad-libbing, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 29, 2004, at A19. 
112. See discussion supra pp. 126-27. 
113. This argument plays into a fourth argument Emerson offers in favor of free 
expression. See Emerson, General Theory, supra note 9, at 885 (arguing that free expression 
promotes social stability by allowing dissenters to blow off steam). Of course, one could 
easily imagine that dissenting by deciding would have the opposite effect—that is, it might 
further energize dissenters and lead them to push harder for their demands. 
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comprehensive institutional strategy for creating space for dissent that takes the 
form of a decision. We know how to ensure that people can speak radically; we 
have not yet figured out how to ensure that people can act radically. 
To be sure, there are areas where we have a model for conceptualizing the 
connection between governance and dissent—American federalism being the 
dominant example. But the federalism model is too limited a strategy for 
creating space for decisional dissent. The federalism model (at least “hard” 
federalism, its strongest variant114) depends on creating a formally bounded 
space for decisional dissent. Hard federalism invokes the notion of sovereignty 
to protect local minorities from national interference. That leads to two types of 
problems. First, as a descriptive matter, the federalism model is too limited to 
be used to protect dissenting by deciding in the many areas where such formal 
enclaves do not exist. Put simply, hard federalism provides de jure protection 
for decisional dissent, whereas many examples of dissenting by deciding arise 
de facto. Second, as a prescriptive matter, there will sometimes be better 
institutional strategies for promoting the values associated with dissenting by 
 
114. For purposes of this discussion, unless I note otherwise, the term federalism refers 
to what I call “hard” or “de jure” federalism—the reliance on state sovereignty and the 
creation of formally protected realms where states may act without federal interference. 
Federalism writ large, of course, encompasses a wide variety of institutional arrangements, 
many of which would fall into the category of de facto rather than de jure protections for 
empowering regional minorities. See Judith Resnik, Categorical Federalism: Jurisdiction, 
Gender, and the Globe, 111 YALE L. J. 619, 619-225 (2001) (contrasting “categorical 
federalism” and “multi-faceted federalism”); Young, supra note 25, at 16-17 (offering a 
somewhat different formulation for distinguishing between “hard” and “soft” federalism). 
Examples of this sort of “soft” or “de facto” federalism include the many areas where the 
federal government and states exercise concurrent jurisdiction; in these areas, absent federal 
preemption, the state may wield power along with, or in the absence of, the federal exercise 
of power. Moreover, there are areas of cooperative federalism, where the state and federal 
governments regulate together. See Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture 
for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665, 671 (2001); see also Roderick M. 
Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes 
Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998); Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Cooperative Federalism and Co-optation, 92 YALE L.J. 1344 (1983). Finally, 
federal systems outside of the United States operate without deploying formal notions of 
sovereignty to protect state decisionmaking power. 
 In each of these instances of soft federalism, the space left for decisional dissent 
depends—as with the examples described below, infra notes 117-121 and accompanying 
text—on an informal give-and-take between the national government and the states. See, 
e.g., John P. Dwer, The Practice of Federalism Under the Clean Air Act, 54 MD. L. REV 
1183 (1995) (describing the way that pragmatic concerns, informal bargaining, and political 
give-and-take among state and federal officials affect the implementation of federal 
environmental law); Hills, supra, at 856 (arguing that the anti-commandeering cases are best 
understood as creating a “property rule” that allows state governments to bargain effectively 
with the federal government about state implementation of federal law); Larry D. Kramer, 
Putting the Politics Back Into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV 
215 (2000); Larry D. Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); 
Mark Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (describing Delaware’s 
adaptation of its corporate law regulations in response to the threat of federal preemption). 
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deciding, strategies that do not depend on the notion of enclave. If we value 
dissenting by deciding because it allows dissenters to affiliate with the polity 
even as they express disagreement with it, protecting dissent through formal 
notions of sovereignty may weaken the link between dissenters and the 
polity.115 I discuss each claim in turn. 
De jure v. de facto protection for dissenting by deciding. Federalism is 
perhaps the most fully theorized strategy for preserving opportunities for 
decisional dissent. It has not been cast in these terms, of course, and serves a 
variety of ends unrelated to the notion of dissent. Nonetheless, federalism can 
be understood at least in part as a strategy for allowing would-be dissenters to 
govern in some subpart of the system. Unsurprisingly, then, some scholars of 
federalism have explored a number of the values associated with what I have 
termed dissenting by deciding.116 
As a purely descriptive matter, there is at least one crucial difference 
between hard federalism and other variants of decisional dissent. Federalism 
facilitates dissenting by deciding through an enclave strategy; it creates a 
formally delineated space where would-be dissenters exercise sovereign power. 
If we are interested in creating space for dissenters to decide, one of the 
obvious advantages of an enclave strategy is that it guarantees a protected space 
in which the minority is shielded from interference by the majority. It thus 
provides de jure protection for decisional dissent. But dissenting by deciding 
often emerges de facto, where there is no formally delineated space for 
dissent.117 Because most disaggregated institutions where dissenting by 
deciding occurs are at the lower end of the political hierarchy, the chance to 
register dissent through a decision in such contexts emerges ad hoc, either by 
the grace of the majority or out of practical necessity. These decisionmaking 
bodies are usually charged with implementing or applying a legislative 
 
115. Cf. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 182 (1995) (arguing that self-
government rights that protect national ethnic minorities from intrusion by the national 
government are “unlikely . . . to . . . serve an integrative function” because they rest on the 
claim that “there is more than one political community, and that the authority of the larger 
state cannot be assumed to take precedent over the authority of the constituent national 
communities”). 
116. Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 389-94, 397-400, 
401-02 (1997-98) (analyzing whether federalism promotes democratic participation, 
encourages innovation, and fosters cultural diversity); Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and 
Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 66 (2001) (arguing that the protection 
of state autonomy enables states to serve as competing sources of norms); Porterfield, 
supra note 9 (suggesting that the protections afforded to private expression should be 
extended to state measures designed to express disapproval of foreign regimes); Jason 
Mazzone, The Social Capital Argument for Federalism, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 27 
(2001-2002) (arguing that federalism promotes social capital); Young, supra note 9 
(discussing participatory, expressive, and experimental values associated with state 
autonomy). 
117. There is at least one exception to this observation: the protection afforded to the 
jury to engage in nullification. 
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mandate—a jury applying the law enacted by the legislature, a school 
committee implementing the policy set by an education department.118 
Dissenting by deciding in these instances involves interstitial dissent. 
Electoral minorities can dissent only within the space left open by the 
centralized decisionmaker. Juries, for instance, can render a decision only 
within a range set by the legislature. Appellate panels are constrained by the 
precedent of a single superior court. School committees implement policy 
within a range set by a central policymaker. 
Dissenting by deciding in these contexts does not, however, depend 
entirely on the willingness of the majority to cede some discretion to the lower-
level decisionmakers. Disaggregated institutions are often a solution to the 
problem of mass governance. A legislature cannot render a decision in every 
criminal case or draft every legislative report. A single court cannot decide 
every case that enters the judicial system. Central decisionmakers, of necessity, 
must cede some discretion to lower-level decisionmakers to interpret and 
implement the majority’s decrees. And in the gap between the rule and the 
interpretation lies room for would-be dissenters to express their own 
preferences and views—a de facto space for dissenting by deciding. 
The power that would-be dissenters can exercise in implementing or 
interpreting the majority’s views is further augmented when, as is often the 
case, the majority cannot control the membership of the disaggregated 
institution. Interstitial dissent is likely to be insignificant in a truly centralized 
system, where a central decisionmaker appoints underlings to carry out its 
preferences. But dissenting by deciding often occurs in a system where the 
decisionmaking body is drawn from a different part of the polity than the 
central authority. Juries, for instance, are randomly assigned and drawn from 
districts that may bear no resemblance to the polity as a whole. Appellate 
panels, simply by virtue of the episodic nature of judicial appointments and the 
vagaries of the random draw, may not mirror the composition of the superior 
court. School committees or regional governments are elected from a 
territorially defined area. 
These institutional arrangements thus tend to involve the separation of 
powers with a twist.119 Under a traditional separation of powers scheme, the 
executive elected by the whole polity checks a legislature elected by the whole 
polity, or a court appointed by an executive elected by the whole checks a 
legislature elected by the whole. In both instances, even if these institutions 
“represent” the people in a different way,120 we nonetheless see a 
representative of the whole checking another representative of the whole. 
 
118. This list would even include the “softer” variants of federalism, where states and 
the federal government exercise concurrent jurisdiction or engage in cooperative federalism. 
Supra, text accompanying note 114. 
119. Thanks to Brucke Ackerman for prodding me to think more about this question. 
120. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 184-86 (1991). 
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Under a disaggregated system, we find part of the polity checking the whole, 
thus moving us in the direction of a federalism model (without the overlay of 
sovereignty). A jury representing a subpart of the polity checks legislative 
overreaching.121 Members of a legislative committee can prevent legislation 
from going forward even if a majority of their colleagues support it. A school 
committee may subvert a policy decision handed down by a legislature in the 
way it implements that mandate. 
Because the centralized authority cannot appoint the members of many 
disaggregated decisionmaking bodies, to enforce its mandate it must rely at 
least in part on the informal give-and-take we call politics. The majority must 
expend political capital if it wants its mandates to be carried out precisely. How 
much space is left for interstitial dissent in a given context will depend on the 
intensity of the majority’s preferences—how far it is willing to go to police the 
decisions of lower-level decisionmakers. But there will always be some play in 
the joints, some decisionmaking discretion left to lower-level decisionmakers. 
In sum, while hard federalism formally reserves a space for would-be 
dissenters to decide, dissenting by deciding often emerges in a more haphazard 
fashion and can be subject to expansion or contraction, depending on the 
majority’s views. The hard federalism model, which hinges on de jure 
protection for decisional dissent, thus does not apply to the full range of 
contexts where dissenting by deciding emerges de facto in the American 
political system. We need a more capacious language before we can devise an 
appropriate institutional strategy for preserving avenues for decisional dissent. 
 The enclave strategy and strengthening civic ties. Turning from the 
descriptive to the prescriptive, hard federalism may also fall short as a universal 
model for creating space for dissenting by deciding. That is, we might well 
conclude that a de jure strategy for protecting decisional dissent is not always 
the best one. While the benefit derived from hard federalism is the existence of 
formal and permanent space for dissent, the costs to this strategy similarly stem 
from reliance on an enclave for protecting dissenters. Although the protection 
for dissenting by deciding may be less reliable (or at least less predictable) in a 
de facto rather than a de jure model, the dissenting decisions ultimately 
rendered under a de facto system may be more likely to cement the ties 
between the dissenter and the polity. That is because, under a federal regime, 
one must be a member of a separate—even competing—sovereign in order to 
engage in decisional dissent.  
 To the extent that dissenting by deciding involves a blend of affiliation and 
contestation, a de facto strategy for protecting decisional dissent—one that does 
 
121. In the aggregate, of course, all of the juries taken together represent the whole. 
And, as with Ackerman’s characterization of the way the separation of powers scheme 
functions, id. at 184, they “represent” the people differently than other institutions, either 
because they involve direct participation by the people seriatim or because they deal with on-
the-ground applications of the broad mandates enacted at the upper levels of government. 
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not rely on the notion of enclave—may go further in allowing dissenters to 
affirm their membership in the polity at the same time they express 
disagreement with the views of the majority. If dissenting by deciding under a 
federal system takes the form of a patchwork quilt—clearly delineated red or 
blue squares stitched together to form a single fabric—decisional dissent under 
a de facto strategy looks more like a kaleidoscope. There is no formally 
delineated territory for dissenters to occupy; dissent simply emerges from a 
handful of decisions haphazardly scattered throughout a number of institutions. 
Every decision, no matter what its color and shape, becomes part of a larger 
pattern in the kaleidoscope. It is therefore difficult to separate “us” from 
“them.”122 
It is, of course, hard to assess whether these distinctions matter in practice 
because we lack a shared language to describe in general terms the many 
instances of decisional dissent we see in the American context. My point here is 
simply that the language of hard federalism—replete with references to 
separate, even competing sovereigns—does not quite describe the phenomenon 
and may, indeed, undermine some of the possibilities associated with this odd 
fusion of governance and dissent. 
The type of full-blown cultural analysis that would be necessary to prove 
such a claim is beyond the scope of this paper. Here I can offer just one 
example of why I think the language of hard federalism does not fully capture 
what makes dissenting by deciding unique. I turn to what one author has termed 
the “judicial culture”—“the empirical assumptions, historical interpretations, 
and normative ideals . . . that seem to inform and influence . . . current 
constitutional law . . . .”123 The most useful data point for these purposes seems 
to be U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), a case that 
squarely presents the relationship between state-based dissent and national 
identity. 
In Term Limits, the Supreme Court invalidated Arkansas’s imposition of 
term limits on federal candidates for Congress.124 The term-limit rule was 
passed by the voters of Arkansas by initiative. The Justices had much to say 
 
122. One might fairly respond that if would-be dissenters go “too far” in the eyes of the 
majority, their decision will not be embraced as an act of affiliation, but viewed as the 
decision of an outlier group. The O.J. Simpson verdict might represent this type of 
phenomenon. But even here, the informal nature of the protection afforded to dissenting by 
deciding may provide a useful corrective in the long term. Under a federal system, there may 
be nothing the people in a blue state can do to affect the policies of a red state, or vice versa. 
But members of the majority in a single polity can place limits on the power of decisional 
dissent precisely because the institution in question is formally part of the same polity. In the 
long run, that fact may help push the activities of would-be dissenters into more politically 
palatable channels. Whether one thinks the result is a healthy dose of realism for dissenters 
or a dynamic that waters down dissent so as to make it meaningless, it leads to a different 
type of affiliation than the federalism strategy. 
123. Richard H. Pildes, Democracy and Disorder, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 696 (2001). 
124. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
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about what the Constitution and the historical record revealed about the term-
limits rule. What is most intriguing about the opinion for these purposes is that 
the Justices seemed to lack a vocabulary for deciding what, precisely, the 
citizens of Arkansas were doing in passing the rule. The only language 
available to them was the language of hard federalism125—competing 
sovereigns and enclaves for dissent—and that language could not be used to 
describe what had occurred in Arkansas. 
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion, for instance, leaned heavily on the idea 
that the term-limits rule was the product of a dissenting enclave. Indeed, the 
notion of competing sovereigns seemed to push the majority to conclude that 
the Arkansas initiative would threaten the relationship between the nation and 
her citizens, perhaps even undermine our national identity. The phrase that best 
captures the majority’s reasoning—repeated no fewer than five times by the 
majority and termed the “most important[]” premise of the decision126—was 
that “such a state-imposed restriction is contrary to the ‘fundamental principle 
of our representative democracy’ . . . that ‘the people should choose whom they 
please to govern them.’”127 
The odd thing about the majority’s insistence that “the right to choose 
representatives belongs not to the States, but to the people,”128 was that it was 
the citizens of Arkansas who adopted the term-limits provision by initiative. 
 
125. The same is true of the scholarship the decision has generated. One of the most 
important analyses of the case is titled “Dueling Sovereignties,” see Kathleen Sullivan, 
Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109 HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995), 
and most other authors adopt a similar view of the case. See, e.g., Charles Fried, Foreword: 
Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995); Chris Marks, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton and United States v. Lopez: The Supreme Court Resuscitates the Tenth 
Amendment, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 541 (1997); Rebecca E. Zietlow, Belonging, Protection 
and Equality: The Neglected Citizenship Clause and the Limits of Federalism, 62 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 281 (2000); Neil M. Richards, Note, U.S. Terms Limits v. Thornton and Competing 
Notions of Federalism, 12 J.L. & POL. 521 (1996). The outlier in this respect is Robert 
Nagel. Robert F. Nagel, The Term Limits Dissent: What Nerve, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 843 
(1996). While he reads the majority, as I do, as relying heavily on the notion of competing 
sovereigns, id. at 844-45, 850-51, he demonstrates some sympathy for an alternative view, 
“the possibility that state interests may legitimately help to define the national interest.” Id. 
at 851.  David Barron’s work on localism sounds a related theme, as he emphasizes the role 
that local governments can play in giving substantive content to constitutional principles. See 
David Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism 147 U. 
PENN.. L. REV 487 (1999). 
126. Id. at 806. Similarly, the primary precedent on which the majority relied was 
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), where Congress had refused to seat Adam 
Clayton Powell, whom the people of one of New York’s congressional districts had elected 
to the House. 514 U.S. at 797-98. In addition to Powell’s historical analysis of the 
Qualifications Clause, its “critical postulate that sovereignty is vested in the people, and that 
sovereignty confers on the people the right to choose freely their representatives to the 
National Government,” id. at 794 (citing Powell, 395 U.S. at 541), was central to the Term 
Limits majority’s decision. 
127. 514 U.S. at 783 (internal citation omitted). 
128. 514 U.S. at 820-21. 
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The citizens were, in fact, “choos[ing] whom they please to govern them”—
they chose not to be governed by someone who had already served three terms 
in the House of Representatives or two terms in the Senate. Had the term-limits 
rule been passed by the state legislature, the majority’s fears would have been 
easier to grasp because it would at least have been possible to imagine a sort of 
interinstitutional competition between the state and federal legislatures.129 But 
the idea that the citizens of Arkansas were somehow interfering with their own 
relationship to the national government seems quite odd. 
Perhaps sensing this disconnect, the majority responded to this issue in a 
footnote, where it insisted that “the voters of Arkansas, in adopting 
Amendment 73, were acting as citizens of the State of Arkansas, and not as 
citizens of the National Government.”130  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
pursued a similar theme.131 
 Notice the oddly compartmentalized conception of citizenship embraced by 
both the majority and Justice Kennedy. Both opinions seem to assume that the 
voters of Arkansas can issue an outlier decision only if they are acting as 
citizens of Arkansas rather than as citizens of the United States. The two 
identities, however, must remain distinct. On this view, the decision of the state 
polity cannot be embraced as a decision of the national polity—hence the 
majority’s odd conclusion that it is possible to cast a vote in one’s capacity as a 
citizen of the state that undermines one’s relationship to the nation. Put 
differently, because the federalism model—with its language of enclave and 
separate spheres—so dominated the analysis, it was difficult for the Justices to 
imagine that the Arkansas voters were embracing a national identity even as 
they adopted an outlier view. 
Justice Thomas might have been able to make much hay of these 
conceptual back flips, but he, too, lacked a vocabulary for describing precisely 
 
129. At least some of the historical material on which the majority relied plainly refers 
to this type of competition. See, e.g., id. at 809 (quoting Hamilton’s observation that placing 
the power to regulate national elections “in the hands of State legislatures . . . would leave 
the existence of the Union entirely at their mercy”) (emphasis added); id. at 809-11 
(describing several examples of the reluctance of the Framers to cede power over the 
national government to state legislatures). 
130. Id. at 822 n.32. 
131. Justice Kennedy noted that “[t]he Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the 
genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one 
federal, each protected from incursion by the other.”).Id. at 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
Given this strict dichotomy, Kennedy viewed the decision of the citizens of Arkansas to 
enact the term-limits initiative as “the State’s attempted interference with the federal right to 
vote . . . .”  Id. at 844 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (emphasis added). It was thus a “right[] that 
do[es] not derive from the state power in the first instance but that belong[s] to the voter in 
his or her capacity as a citizen of the United States.” Id. For Kennedy, as for the majority, the 
issue boiled down to one of sovereignty: “That the States may not invade the sphere of 
federal sovereignty is as incontestable, in my view, as the corollary proposition that the 
Federal Government must be held within the boundaries of its own power when it intrudes 
upon matters reserved to the States.” Id. at 841. 
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what the voters of Arkansas had done. Thomas plainly noticed the odd 
assumption about citizenship that undergirds the majority’s opinion.132 
Nonetheless, he was unable to gain much intellectual traction from the fact that 
the citizens of Arkansas had adopted the provision in question.133 Although the 
dissent half-heartedly resists the majority’s claim that citizens act in their 
capacity as citizens of the state or nation, but not both,134 the bulk of its 
analysis seems nonetheless to rest on the same assumption.135  
Term Limits, then, suggests the powerful hold that the notion of competing 
sovereigns has upon the imaginations of the Justices. The language of hard 
federalism makes it difficult for them to view the vote of the citizens of 
Arkansas as anything but a threat to the national sovereign. They cannot see the 
outlier decision of the citizens of Arkansas as an act of national affiliation or  
conceptualize a departure from uniformity to represent a decision of the 
national polity (or at least some part of it).  
To get a better sense of the potential shortcomings of the hard federalism 
model here, consider whether these opinions could have been written in this 
fashion if voters in four or five congressional districts scattered throughout the 
country had voted out their congressional representatives after two terms or if 
they had signed a pledge or contract to do so. It is difficult to imagine the Court 
 
132. For instance, he opened his dissent by remarking dryly that the majority opinion 
“defends the right of the people of Arkansas ‘to choose whom they please to govern them’ 
by invalidating a provision that won nearly 60% of the votes cast in a direct election and that 
carried every congressional district in the State.” Id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Similarly, he rejected Justice Kennedy’s claim that the term-limits rule interfered with the 
relationship between the nation and its citizens because “when one strips away its 
abstractions, the concurring opinion is simply saying that the people of Arkansas cannot be 
permitted to inject themselves into the process by which they themselves select Arkansas’ 
representatives in Congress.” Id. at 859 (Thomas, J., dissenting). And he observed, quite 
rightly, that “even if one believed that the Framers intended to bar state legislatures from 
adopting qualifications laws that restrict the people’s choices, it would not follow that the 
people themselves are precluded from agreeing upon eligibility requirements to help narrow 
their own choices.” Id. at 884. 
133. For example, he devotes a scant two paragraphs of his eighty-one-page dissent to 
the distinction between the people of a state and the state legislature. Id. at 883-84. Perhaps 
even more tellingly, although Justice Thomas relies heavily on the Tenth Amendment, he 
discusses only the powers reserved to “the States,” not “the people,” U.S. Const., Amend. 
X., and does not even mention the Ninth Amendment. 
134. See, e.g., 514 U.S. at 858 (“When the people of Georgia pick their representatives 
in Congress, they are acting as the people of Georgia, not as the corporate agents for the 
undifferentiated people of the Nation as a whole.”); id. at 859-60 (“Even at the level of 
national politics, then, there always remains a meaningful distinction between someone who 
is a citizen of the United States and of Georgia and someone who is a citizen of the United 
States and of Massachusetts . . . . The people of each State have retained their independent 
political identity.”). 
135. Thomas directs his energies not to debunking the federal-state dichotomy 
established by the majority opinion, but to challenging the majority’s conclusion that the 
power in question was reserved to the national sovereign rather than to the state one. Supra 
note 126. 
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invalidating those choices on the ground that these decisions were made in the 
voters’ capacity as citizens of congressional districts x, y, and z and not as 
citizens of the national polity. It is even more difficult to imagine the Justices 
finding that those decisions somehow threatened our national identity.136 The 
Court, of course, might nonetheless have forbidden the use of a precommitment 
device (like the statewide initiative in Term Limits) to achieve those aims.137 It 
might equally have concluded that the Constitution embodied the national 
majority’s conscious decision not to allow departures from uniformity in the 
qualifications for national office. But the threat of competition that does so 
much work in the majority opinion and the concurrence would be unavailing. 
The Term Limits decision is thus suggestive of the need for a more 
capacious vocabulary for understanding the phenomenon of decisional dissent, 
one that does not rest so heavily on the notion of formally designated enclaves. 
A federalism strategy for fostering dissenting by deciding has obvious 
strengths. The enclave strategy may more effectively guarantee space for 
would-be dissenters to engage in governance than any alternative. But the hard 
federalism model may also reduce the chance that an act of dissent will be 
perceived as an act of affiliation with the polity. We might therefore sometimes 
prefer alternative strategies for institutionalizing decisional dissent, even if they 
make dissent less reliably available. 
For instance, we might want at least some decisions rendered by dissenters 
to be embraced as decisions of the polity, as they often seem to be with juries 
or appellate panels.138 Or we might look to the regional government model, 
where territory plays an interesting role in delineating the relationship between 
minority and majority.139 While local governments lack the formal autonomy 
that sovereignty guarantees, territorial boundaries lend these institutions a level 
of functional independence that seems to exceed that accorded to many other 
disaggregated institutions.140 And the notion of overlapping citizenship seems 
to sit more comfortably in this context: one can imagine oneself both as a 
resident of San Francisco (which brings with it a distinctive sense of 
 
136. They might have viewed these decisions as Robert Nagel views the term-limits 
initiative struck down in Term Limits, part of a “continuing role [for] state-based policies in 
shaping the national culture,” a collaborative effort between the states and the union to shape 
a shared national identity. Nagel, supra note 120, at 851. 
137. For an in-depth exploration of this notion and the potential arguments in favor of a 
term-limits rule, see Einer Elhauge, Are Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83 
(1997). 
138. See infra Part III.D 
139. I am indebted to Dan Weiner for suggesting this line of inquiry. 
140. See Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1763, 
1789 (2002) (“Cities are creatures of the state, and state officials regularly and routinely 
subject them to detailed supervision and control” but due to “emotional . . . attachment to 
local decisionmaking,” states find that “[h]aving delegated considerable authority over 
[certain] issues to local governments, states are largely unwilling to override their decisions 
even though they have the power to do so”). 
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community identity) and as a resident of California. It may also be harder for a 
Californian to identify San Franciscans as “not us”141 in the easy fashion that 
residents of red states and blue states seem to identify one another. Finally, we 
might want to think about other regionally defined entities as a model. A school 
committee’s decision, for instance, is understood to be the decision of a state 
entity, but we also know that it will affect only a single school system. Would-
be dissenters, then, are understood to be part of the polity, but only part of it. 
C. Identity and Expression: The Relationship Between Collective Dissent and 
Public Action 
A final reason that we value dissent is because it allows individuals to 
define and express their identity. A major strand of First Amendment theory 
thus focuses on speech as an opportunity for self-actualization. Scholars who 
write in this vein laud the First Amendment’s role in maintaining individual 
autonomy and promoting self-expression.142 Here I move away from the purely 
individualist model of self-expression that dominates First Amendment 
scholarship and consider more group-oriented conceptions of identity143—
specifically questions of racial or ethnic difference. After all, the problem of 
dissent seems to be most nettlesome when the views of the polity divide along 
group lines and those in dissent share the same racial or ethnic background.144 
 
141. Cf. id. at 1793 (“[n]o one thinks of municipal boundaries as dividing one pre-
political ‘people’ from another.”). But see Richard Ford, Law’s Territory (A History of 
Jurisdiction), 97 MICH. L. REV. 843, 922-25 (1999) (offering a critical reading of Romer v. 
Evans as standing for the proposition that minorities must withdraw into enclaves in order to 
wield power). For a different view of the relationship between Romer, local government, and 
the protection of minorities, see Barron, supra note 125, at 587-97. 
142. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); 
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (YEAR?); DAVID A.J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 165-77 (1986); SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE, supra note 2 (1990); C. Edwin Baker, 
Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978); Charles 
Fried, The New First Amendment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225 
(1992). 
143. For an analysis and critique of this strain of First Amendment scholarship, see, 
e.g., SHIFFRIN, supra note 43; Nan Hunter, Escaping the Expression-Equality Conundrum, 61 
OHIO ST. L.J. 167 (2000); Nan Hunter, Expressive Identity: Recuperating Dissent for 
Equality; 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (2000). Although Shiffrin and Hunter both critique 
the individualist strain of First Amendment doctrine and scholarship, Hunter goes further 
than Shiffrin in trying to reconnect social identity with the notion of dissent. 
144. Here I wish to bracket a broader debate about whether race is—or ought to be—a 
fluid identity category. Although a formal, stable conception of racial categories permeates 
most legal debates, see MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF 59 (1997), many have 
argued that race is a semifluid category, one that can be shaped by individuals as they 
participate in the political process. See, e.g., ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR 
CONSCIOUS: THE POLITICAL MORALITY OF RACE 78, 80 (1996); Richard T. Ford, Beyond 
“Difference,” in LEFT LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38, 48 (Wendy Brown & Janet Halley eds., 
2003); see also MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 
50-51 (1997); IRIS MANION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 99 (2000; IRIS MANION 
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Dealing with dissent is difficult in this context because we are dealing not just 
with disagreement, but disagreement that corresponds to power disparities and 
the continuing legacy of past discrimination. One’s status as a member of a 
subordinated group overlaps with one’s status as a dissenter. 
To the extent that participation in governance allows an individual to 
constitute her identity—to define her political self and her relationship to the 
community145—we might think that an identity category, like race, that is 
salient to an individual’s personal identity might similarly be salient to her civic 
identity. If, as some political theorists claim, one’s group identity influences the 
way that one participates in the political process, so too an individual’s 
participatory experiences may help shape her group identity. The notion of 
dissent, then, may be relevant to the formation of personal and civic identity at 
the group level, just as many believe it is at the individual level. 
Although those who emphasize the expressive dimensions of dissent do not 
often consider the issue of group identity, the conventional view of dissent 
maps on quite neatly to one of the primary strategies proposed for dealing with 
the issue of group difference in democratic decisionmaking: the “politics of 
recognition.”146 Just as proponents of conventional dissent seek to ensure the 
presence of a dissenter on every decisionmaking body, proponents of the 
 
YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 46 (1990). Nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that many of the arguments I make here fit well with scholarship that places special 
emphasis on the participatory dimensions of racial identity. See, e.g., GUINIER & TORRES, 
supra note 88, at 11-14 (arguing that race should be understood as a political category); see 
also YOUNG, POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE, supra, at 156-91 (exploring how group members have 
participated in the reconstitution of their group identity). 
145. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS 
FOR A NEW AGE 119-20, 152 (1984); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF LIBERAL 
DEMOCRACY 99-100 (1977); IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 
92 (1990); Ellen D. Katz, Race and the Right to Vote After Rice v. Cayetano, 99 MICH. L. 
REV. 491, 512-14 (2000); Frank I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American 
Constitutional Argument: Voting Rights, 41 FLA. L. REV. 443, 478-79 (1989). For an 
analysis of the intellectual roots of this vision, see the discussion of Mill and Rousseau in 
CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 22-33 (1970). 
146. There are as many different versions of this theory as there are theorists, and their 
views of identity and the role it ought to play range dramatically, with some finding group 
identity to be a meaningful category, others focusing simply on the experience or social 
status shared by group members, others positing that shared experiences will lead to 
common interests or perspectives, and still others questioning the very usefulness of such 
categories. For a helpful introduction to this concept and the history of its development, see 
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE 
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). For additional reflections on the 
politics of recognition, both supportive and critical, see the responses in that volume; 
MINOW, supra note 108, ch. 2; PHILLIPS, supra note 72; NANCY ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP 
AND MORALS ch. 9 (1998); MELISSA S. WILLIAMS, VOICE, TRUST, AND MEMORY: 
MARGINALIZED GROUPS AND THE FAILINGS OF LIBERAL REPRESENTATION (1998); IRIS 
MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 121-53 (2000); YOUNG, supra note 109, at 44, 
183-91; Jane Mansbridge, Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? 
A Contingent “Yes”, 61 J. POL. 628 (1999). 
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politics of recognition seek to guarantee racial and ethnic minorities a 
presence—or voice—in every part of the political process.147 Dissenting by 
deciding, in contrast, would sacrifice the chance for racial minorities to have a 
voice on every decisionmaking body. It would instead concentrate racial 
minorities on a subset of decisionmaking bodies so that they had a chance to 
control the outcome of those decisions. 
If one thinks concretely about institutionalizing these two visions of dissent 
in a context where the identity of the dissenter roughly aligns with membership 
in a subordinated group, conventional dissent (the natural institutional strategy 
for implementing the politics of recognition) does not merely require racial 
minorities to choose between acting moderately and speaking radically. It also 
requires them to choose between acting in isolation or speaking together. 
Dissenting by deciding, in contrast, allows racial minorities to act together. As 
a result, these two strategies for institutionalizing dissent create quite different 
fora for the expression of group identity. I examine the “politics of recognition” 
as a strategy for institutionalizing dissent in Part II.C.1, and I contrast it with 
decisional dissent in Parts II.C.2 and II.C.3. 
1. The “politics of recognition”: Isolation and enclaves 
One crucial difference between the fora for self-expression created by the 
“politics of recognition” strategy and the decisional dissent model has to do 
with numbers and, thus, with power. The goal of the politics of recognition is to 
ensure that at least one “representative” of each minority group has a chance to 
articulate the group’s perspective on every decisionmaking body. It thus 
requires us to spread racial minorities across all decisionmaking bodies rather 
than to concentrate them in a few. The result of this empowerment strategy is a 
set of decisionmaking bodies in which racial minorities are always numerical 
minorities. 
What that means in practice is that racial minorities who wield the 
authority of the state do so in relative isolation from other members of the 
group. Under the system favored by adherents to the politics of recognition, one 
would expect 10 or 20 percent of the decisionmakers to be members of the 
relevant minority group—one or two African-Americans on a jury, one Latina 
on a school committee, etc. To the extent that these individuals understood their 
group identity to influence their perspective on the issue before them, they 
would have a chance to articulate those views. But the expression of identity 
would be a relatively solitary act: the statement of one or two group members 
on a given decisionmaking body. Under such circumstances, racial minorities 
might feel pressure to speak “on behalf” of the group or to conform their 
statements to internal or external conceptions of the group’s identity.148 At a 
 
147. See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 144, at 183-91. 
148. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 318-19 (2003) (describing testimony of 
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minimum, the absence of a critical mass of group members would mean that 
there would be relatively little chance that internal dissent—disagreement 
among group members regarding the existence or nature of the group’s 
identity—would emerge during this process. 
Moreover, the politics of recognition may ultimately reproduce in 
decisionmaking bodies the same level of powerlessness that group members 
experience polity-wide. Precisely because their numbers on any given 
decisionmaking body are few under the “politics of recognition” strategy, racial 
minorities will wield roughly the same amount of power on the decisionmaking 
body as members of the group wield within the polity as a whole. Group 
members exploring the relationship between their personal and civic identities 
might discern little difference between the experience of being in the minority 
on a jury or school committee and their experiences as a minority outside of 
that context. If part of the reason we wish to reserve civic space for racial 
minorities to dissent is that we are concerned about the group’s lack of power, 
the “politics of recognition” strategy may both undermine and reify existing 
political dynamics. 
At the very least, it is quite unlikely that racial minorities will be able to 
give full vent to their perspectives. Their numbers destine them to play the role 
of “influencer” in the decisionmaking process and thus preclude them from 
exercising full control over the message being conveyed by the state decision. 
Perhaps because acting in isolation does not provide an entirely satisfactory 
solution to the problem of group difference, some advocates of the “politics of 
recognition” have argued that we ought to maintain alternative fora for racial 
groups to gather—safe spaces for group members to shape and give expression 
to their identity. Safe spaces ensure that the expression of group identity is not 
a solitary act; it guarantees that racial minorities have a place to hash out their 
views along with other members of their group. In such circumstances, group 
members may not experience the same type of pressure to articulate “the” 
group’s perspective. To the contrary, the sheer number of minority group 
members present is likely to create space for disagreement among members 
about the nature—or even the existence—of a group perspective. And the 
private enclave guarantees group members a level of control that they are 
unlikely to encounter when participating directly in the process of governance. 
Notice, however, that the safe space strategy is the rough cognate of speaking 
radically. Dissent takes the form of private speech, not a public decision. To the 
extent that group members wish to speak as a collective about the group’s 
identity, they can only do so on behalf of themselves, not on behalf of the state. 
 
witnesses that the law school sought a “critical mass” of students to ensure that no member 
of the minority group felt pressured to be a spokesperson for that group); Andrew G. Deiss, 
Negotiating Justice: The Criminal Trial Jury in a Pluralist America, 3 U. CHI. L. SCH. 
ROUNDTABLE 323, 342 (1996) (arguing that a jury with eleven whites and one African-
American will pressure the latter into “view[ing] herself as a representative of her race”). 
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Under the politics of recognition strategy for dealing with group difference, 
group members can speak radically and they can speak collectively, but the 
collective expression of group identity is limited to private speech, not public 
action. 
2. Dissenting by deciding: Fusing the collective act with the public one 
Dissenting by deciding, in contrast, fuses the public act with the collective 
one. Because it concentrates racial minorities on a subset of decisionmaking 
bodies, they need not choose between acting in isolation or speaking 
collectively. Under a system that fosters dissenting by deciding, group 
members can act collectively—they can engage with a critical mass of group 
members in expressing the group’s identity on behalf of the state. What this 
means in practice is that the process of defining the connection between civic 
and personal identity involves many voices, not one. It thus provides an 
institutional solution for those seeking to move away from an individualist 
understanding of dissent.149 
Perhaps more importantly, group members speak together at the same 
moment that they speak on behalf of the state.150 Opportunities for group 
members to hash out the connection between group and civic identity together 
exist under the “politics of recognition” and other conventional accounts of 
dissent. But it is only decisional dissent that allows group members to engage 
collectively in that process at the same moment they are performing a civic act, 
and we might suspect that the relationship between group and civic identity 
might look different when it is forged in the crucible of a governance decision. 
Put differently, what is intriguing about the notion of dissenting by 
deciding is that subordinated group members get a chance to speak truth with 
power in a dual sense—exercising control over the message (by virtue of their 
numbers) at the same time they wield state authority (by virtue of the form that 
dissent takes). Dissenting by deciding thus picks up on the strands of First 
Amendment doctrine that protect not only “abstract discussion” but collective 
efforts to get something done.151 It also resonates with Lani Guinier and Gerald 
Torres’s conception of “political race”: “Unlike identity politics, political race 
 
149. See SHIFFRIN, ROMANCE, supra note2, at 91-96. 
150. Here again, the notion of dissenting by deciding picks up on a strain in 
Meiklejohn’s conception of the First Amendment as a tool of self-government, not 
individual expression. See, e.g., MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 86, at 61-62 
(critiquing Holmes, who made famous the marketplace metaphor of the First Amendment, 
for his “excessive individualism” and his failure to grasp “the theory of cooperation”). 
151. See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429-30 (1963) (concluding that 
NAACP litigation, designed to “achiev[e] . . . equality of treatment by all government, 
federal, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in this country” through a 
“cooperative . . . group activity” was “a form of political expression”); see also supra notes 
51-52 and accompanying text (discussing Meiklejohn).   
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is not about being but instead is about doing. Political race configures race and 
politics as an action or set of actions rather than a thing.”152  
Further, dissenting by deciding means that racial minorities engage in this 
simultaneously cooperative and expressive act in the presence not only of 
internal dissent, but external dissent as well. Internal dissent is what springs 
from the presence of a critical mass of group members on the decisionmaking 
body. But precisely because decisional dissent does not occur in a purely 
private enclave, members of the majority group also take part in the 
decisionmaking process. Minority group members thus reach a decision in the 
presence of members of the majority group, who may support—or oppose—the 
decision. 
Dissenting by deciding thus offers neither the risk of a permanent minority 
status in the civic realm nor the safety of a private enclave. As with a private 
enclave, racial minorities exercise control over the decision. That control, 
however, stems not from the exclusion of members of the majority from the 
discussion, but from the power of concentrated numbers—the same type of 
power enjoyed by members of the majority in most instances. Members of the 
minority group are thus engaged in a profoundly democratic act—forging 
agreement in the presence of internal dissent and external disagreement. In 
effect, racial minorities stand in the shoes of the majority under the usual 
political dynamic; they enjoy the power to decide, but that decision must be 
made in the presence of internal and external dissent. No longer confined to the 
role of influencer or gadfly, racial minorities wield power in the presence of 
influencers and gadflies. And the type of collective dissent that was once 
forged in a private enclave moves to a decidedly public space. 
3. Tradeoffs and risks 
While dissenting by deciding is best understood as a complement to the 
politics of recognition—it is possible to pursue both strategies simultaneously 
across institutional contexts—we face a trade-off between the two if we focus 
on a single institution, where it will not be possible to pursue both design 
strategies simultaneously. On the one hand, dissenting by deciding sacrifices a 
chance for minority group members to affect all the decisions rendered within a 
particular institutional structure. On the other hand, it offers racial minorities 
the chance to abandon the role of permanent political minority and control 
some subset of decisions. 
Even setting aside this trade-off, here again dissenting by deciding simply 
represents a different—not better—strategy for dealing with the problem of 
group difference. While the politics of recognition emphasizes the dignity of 
voice, dissenting by deciding emphasizes the dignity to decide. While the 
 
152. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 88, at 16. 
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politics of recognition may lead to the creation of private enclaves for racial 
group members to hash out questions of civic and group identity undisturbed, 
the notion of decisional dissent not only places those debates in a civic space, 
but embraces their outcome as a decision of the state.   
Dissenting by deciding may make dissent harder by forcing debates about 
civic and group identity to take place in the presence of majority group 
members who may support—or challenge—the decision. Further, while a 
private enclave deprives one of the chance to speak truth with power, it also 
allows one to craft one’s message without the distraction of outside dissenters. 
On the flip side, the decisional dissent model may help eliminate any inference 
that minority group members require protection from the rough and tumble 
world of politics. 
Nor does the presence of a critical mass necessarily make dissent easier. 
While the company of others may be a source of empowerment, it is, of course, 
easier for one person to speak on behalf of the group than for a number of 
group members to agree on what to say. 
A final cost to decisional dissent is that, as noted above, it is sometimes 
easier to speak truth without power. A government decisionmaking process can 
be a forum non conveniens for expressing group identity. It may be difficult for 
members of a group to speak for themselves and for the polity at the same time. 
A decision rendered under state law may simply be an unwieldy vehicle for 
expressing group members’ views. That conjecture seems most likely to be true 
for those group members who define their identities in opposition to the state, 
who believe that membership in the group depends on an outsider’s status. In 
such instances, the notion of expressing one’s identity through an action of the 
state would be a contradiction in terms. 
III. WHEN SHOULD WE FAVOR DISSENTING BY DECIDING OVER 
CONVENTIONAL DISSENT?: GENERATING A PRODUCTIVE CONVERSATION 
BETWEEN PERIPHERY AND CENTER 
Once we have grasped the trade-offs embedded in these competing—and 
complementary—strategies for institutionalizing dissent, the next question is 
when we would choose one over another. That is, even if we are convinced that 
a healthy democratic infrastructure would include a mix of decisional and 
conventional dissent, we must still decide which variant of dissent to seek 
within a given institutional setting. Where is dissenting by deciding more likely 
to generate a productive conversational dynamic between dissenters and the 
majority, between the periphery and the center? Although the type of detailed, 
contextual analysis necessary to make such a judgment is beyond the scope of 
this Article, this Part offers some preliminary thoughts on the questions we 
would want to answer in making such choices. 
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A. The Center’s Opening Conversational Gambit 
In considering what form of dissent will generate a productive 
conversational dynamic between the center and the periphery, we might focus 
first on the center’s opening gambit. After all, much of the analysis above is 
concerned with the dissenters’ side of the conversation. But in conversations 
between the center and periphery, it is often the center that speaks first, and the 
success of the periphery’s response may depend on what kind of conversational 
opening the center provides. 
One could imagine the beginning of the conversation between the majority 
and dissenters taking at least two forms: a question or an answer. The center 
might ask an open-ended question. For instance, it might frame a broad norm 
and leave lower-level decisionmaking bodies considerable discretion to 
implement it. Block grants, certain educational mandates, and the freedom 
granted to local prosecutors153 seem to fit in this category. Alternatively, the 
center might begin the conversation with an answer by issuing a command to 
lower-level decisionmakers—examples might include sentencing rules, Brown 
v. Board of Education,154 or Roe v. Wade. 
Those two strategies seem likely to elicit different kinds of responses from 
the periphery. If we set aside our views of the content of the command 
(something particularly hard to do with cherished commands, like Brown) and 
simply focus on the political dynamic it sets in place, the former seems more 
likely, on average, to generate a productive conversation in the short term. To 
return to Corbett’s metaphor,155 a question rather than an answer—a broad 
grant of discretion rather than an order—seems more likely to be seen as an 
open hand and thus greeted with one in response. As a symbolic matter, a grant 
of discretion rather than a command seems more likely to be perceived by 
dissenters as a sign of trust. As a practical matter, a grant of discretion offers a 
public decisionmaking process into which minorities can productively channel 
their energies. A conversational gambit that begins with an answer, in contrast, 
offers the periphery a less appetizing set of choices: yes or no, accept or nullify. 
While this gambit is the obvious choice where the majority cannot tolerate 
disuniformity, resistance seems more likely to be the response in the short term. 
B. The Length of the Conversation 
In the long term, however, it becomes more difficult to predict which 
opening conversational gambit is most likely to succeed. If we imagine this 
 
153. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing 
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004). 
154. See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 63, at 72 (arguing that Brown radicalized white 
southerners because “it left [them] no choice but to desegregate their schools”). 
155. Supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
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conversation as a minuet, we might worry about backlash from the center after 
the dissenters have responded. Backlash seems quite likely when the periphery 
resists rather than implements the majority’s command. But backlash can also 
come when a minority gets the bit in its teeth—it takes the discretion it has 
been granted further than the majority anticipated, thus creating the appearance 
that it has hijacked the apparatus of governance for its own purposes. The 
backlash against the decisions by San Francisco and Massachusetts to marry 
gays and lesbians might offer one example of this phenomenon. The fact that 
we often term jury nullification “lawless” is another.156 And backlash, of 
course, begets backlash.157 
C. The Dissenters’ Target Audience 
Another consideration that might influence whether and when dissenting 
by deciding represents a sensible strategy for institutionalizing dissent may 
hinge on the audience dissenters are targeting. If dissenters seek to persuade 
like-minded citizens or think that the majority is simply missing needed 
information to reach the correct decision, dissent that takes the form of an 
argument may be a more productive strategy than dissent that takes the form of 
a decision. After all, dissenters simply need to correct a misperception on the 
majority’s part, and conventional dissent—provided it is sufficiently visible—
seems more likely to achieve this aim because it presents the dissenters’ views 
in a more comprehensive and analytically pure form. 
If instead one wants to challenge the majority’s view—to prove that an 
idea would work in practice or to challenge the majority’s assumption of 
hegemony—dissenting by deciding seems a more likely avenue for effecting 
change.158 This seems particularly true to the extent that viewpoint and identity 
coincide, and dissenters seek to challenge not only a policy choice, but the 
majority’s implicit assumption that it is entitled to make that choice in the first 
place. 
Thus, where we are dealing with a subordinated group, dissenting by 
deciding may further two goals simultaneously. First, it offers a real-world 
instantiation of the group’s views. Second, it turns the tables on the majority, 
 
156. That term, interestingly enough, has also been invoked in describing San 
Francisco’s decision to marry gays and lesbians. Editorial, The Road to Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 7, 2004, at A12 (“Mayor Gavin Newsom’s critics called his actions lawless, but 
the law was, and still is, murky.”). 
157. See supra text accompanying note 64 (discussing Klarman’s view of the political 
dynamic created by Brown). 
158. Cf. Minow, supra note 38, at 734 (arguing that one reason to engage in civil 
disobedience “is to disturb the premises of the legal system that itself excludes or degrades 
an entire class of people,” and suggesting that suffrage protests involving women attempting 
to casts votes both “exercised a privilege of assertion and exhibited the point behind the 
protest that the excluded can themselves act and deserve both the rights and personal dignity 
accorded to others”). 
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allowing members of the subordinated group to shed their usual role as 
dissenters or influencers and engage directly in an act of self-governance.159 
Subordinated group members are not playing the accustomed role of outsider, 
but represent a central force in the decisionmaking process. They are able to 
express views that differ from the majority without sacrificing a chance to 
speak on behalf of the polity. And, in doing so, they can demand recognition of 
their right to speak. 
Dissenting by deciding may thus help redefine what is “normal” in terms of 
policy (what kinds of practices actually exist in the world) and in terms of 
politics (by creating an unusual political space where members of the majority 
are deprived of the comfort and power associated with their majority status and 
members of the minority enjoy the dignity to decide).160 Put differently, 
dissenting by deciding allows subordinated dissenters to challenge the 
majority’s presumption that it is entitled to decide as well as its views on which 
policy is the best one. 
D. The Institutional Site for the Dissenters’ Response 
Another set of considerations that might guide our assessment of which 
type of dissent we wish to promote depends on institutional mission. The most 
obvious reason for rejecting decisional dissent has to do with the costs that 
arise when local minorities get to decide rather than merely to speak.  There are 
some dissenters whom we do not want to empower—for example, those who 
will use the power as a local majority to oppress a local minority, as was the 
case with Jim Crow.  
Further, there are some institutions whose structure and normative 
underpinnings make it a hard fit for decisional dissent. Imagine for these 
purposes that we can group disaggregated institutions into roughly three 
categories: spatially defined decisionmaking bodies (local governments, zoning 
boards, school boards, states), temporally defined decisionmaking bodies 
(juries or appellate panels), and decisionmaking bodies that serve the role of 
agent (as some view legislative committees). We may find that dissenting by 
deciding fits better with some categories of decisionmakers than others. 
For instance, one of the most obvious set of concerns one might have about 
decisional dissent has to do with the costs of variation.161 If we allow dissenters 
to decide, we can expect democratic outputs to vary. The costs of variation may 
be modest where we are talking about spatially defined decisionmaking bodies, 
 
159. For a more in-depth analysis of the values associated with “turning the tables,” see 
Gerken, supra note 31, at 1142-60. 
160. It is thus in keeping with Steven Shiffrin’s view of the purpose of conventional 
dissent: unsettling “unjust hierarchies” based upon “existing customs, habits, traditions, 
institutions, and authorities.” SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra note 2, at 93. 
161. I explore these issues in greater depth in Gerken, supra note 31, at 1161-68, 1180. 
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where geographic boundaries provide a means for rendering variation more 
predictable. The costs of variation may be quite heavy, however, in those 
disaggregated institutions where the decisionmaking body is supposed to serve 
the role of the “agent” of the central decisionmaker since the latter’s job is 
simply to carry out orders. 
Similarly, as a normative matter, our willingness to tolerate variation may 
depend on the type of institution at issue. Indeed, there may be an interesting 
relationship between the willingness of the majority to tolerate decisional 
dissent and the jurisdictional reach of the institution in question.162 Consider 
the difference between promoting decisional dissent in a temporally defined 
institution, like the jury or an appellate court, and a spatially defined one, like a 
local government. In the former case, a decisionmaking body temporarily 
renders a decision whose jurisdictional reach extends to the entire polity. In the 
latter case, a territorially defined institution like a city or a state renders a 
decision whose jurisdictional reach extends only to its borders. 
Interestingly enough, norms about variation seem weaker for the latter than 
the former. For instance, the norm against variation in jury decision is quite 
strong. But we seem to be more comfortable with variation in the context of 
school committees or the policies of local governments; we might disagree with 
the choice made, but we seem less likely to view it as a usurpation of 
authority.163 
The obvious explanation for this phenomenon is the different set of norms 
surrounding judicial decisionmaking. For instance, Robert Post has argued that 
these norms are so powerful that even dissent of the conventional sort in the 
judicial context can jeopardize certain social understandings of the law because 
it “potentially undermines the certainty and confidence which is a principal 
virtue of judicial decisionmaking.”164 But this phenomenon may also be a sign 
that we are less comfortable with dissenting by deciding precisely when we 
think would-be dissenters are speaking on behalf of the polity rather than just 
part of it.165 When a jury decides someone is guilty, that decision binds 
 
162. I am indebted to Matt Price for suggesting this line of analysis. 
163. George Kateb, for instance, argues that representative democracy generally 
involves a part standing in for the whole but specifically exempts the judiciary from his 
claim that “political authority is in essence partial.” Kateb, supra note 57, at 360. 
164. Robert Post, The Supreme Court Opinion as Institutional Practice: Dissent, Legal 
Scholarship, and Decisionmaking in the Taft Court, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1267, 1348 (2001); cf. 
id. at 1381-83 (arguing that the practice of dissent is shaped by cultural understandings of 
law and suggesting that judicial dissent is less likely in an institutional context favoring 
“autonomous law” and where legal actors “take pains to draw ‘a sharp line between 
legislative and judicial functions’” (citation omitted)). 
165. The suggestion that a decision of a court or jury is perceived as the decision of the 
polity rests heavily on the claim that we usually think of these institutions as unitary. While I 
think the claim is a fair descriptive one, it is certainly in some tension with the broader 
normative thrust of much of my research—that the decisions of juries or appellate panels are 
better understood as part of the whole, and that we should understand the views of the polity 
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everyone in the state. When a city decides to adopt a voucher program, it 
affects only residents of that city.166 What that distinction means is that 
dissenting by deciding may be palatable to the majority—for better or worse—
in those disaggregated institutions that are territorially defined because the 
social understanding is that decisionmakers are speaking on behalf of part of 
the polity, but only part of it. 
E. The Composition of the Decisionmaking Body 
One might also think carefully about the composition of the 
decisionmaking bodies used to promote decisional dissent in evaluating what 
type of dissent is most likely to generate a productive conversation between the 
center and the periphery. One might worry, for instance, that dissenting by 
deciding is simply a recipe for creating mini-polarization machines167—
homogeneous bodies on both sides of the divide that do nothing more than help 
like-minded individuals confirm the wisdom of their respective views. Rather 
than generating meaningful dialogue between the majority and the minority, the 
decisions rendered simply polarize the other side and solidify the opposition. 
While some of the values associated with dissenting by deciding might be 
served—in rare instances, better served168—by such homogeneous groupings, 
the presence of majority group members is necessary to achieve at least some 
of the intriguing possibilities associated with decisional dissent.169 Indeed, my 
own normative vision of decisional dissent involves not homogeneous 
groupings, but minority-dominated institutions where members of the majority 
are present but stand in the shoes of the minority. That strategy for 
institutionalizing dissent allows for dissent to emerge within as well as from the 
decisionmaking body.170 It thus seems more likely in the long run not only to 
generate a healthy conversational dynamic between periphery and center, but to 
destabilize existing political dynamics in a fashion that might help combat the 
 
to emerge not from a single decision, but from the collective decisions of many 
disaggregated bodies. See Gerken, supra note 31, at 1137-38. 
166. This possibility sheds an interesting light on one of the developments that took 
place about the gay marriage debate in Massachusetts. State officials have refused to marry 
gays and lesbians from other states. The refusal was nominally based on an arcane state 
statute that dated back to the period in which interracial marriage was prohibited in many 
states. But the political assessment behind it is quite easy to grasp. Massachusetts officials 
presumably thought that the state’s marriage policy would generate less controversy if it 
applied to Massachusetts residents only—that is, if dissenters were not making this decision 
on behalf of the national polity. 
167. Thanks to Cass Sunstein for raising this question. 
168. See supra notes 78-83. 
169. See supra text accompanying notes 152-153. 
170. Cf. SUNSTEIN, supra note 44, at 161-62 (canvassing the potential value associated 
with deliberative enclaves while emphasizing the need to ensure that “enclave 
representatives are subject to the broader debate”). 
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problem of subordination.171 
F. The Identity of the Dissenter: Average Citizens v. Dissenting Elites 
Finally, our view on which form of dissent best achieves our aims may be 
influenced by our assessment of what part of the political hierarchy is most 
likely to generate productive change. If we think that what I have termed 
“dissenting elites”172 are most likely to generate useful reform, conventional 
dissent seems like our only option for the reasons noted above.173  
If, however, we think that productive change is more likely to emanate 
from below, dissenting by deciding seems like the right tool for average 
citizens to effect meaningful change. Indeed, each of the trade-offs described 
above suggests that decisional dissent might be especially well-suited for 
fostering dissent at the lower end of the political hierarchy. First, dissenting by 
deciding may help make the views of average citizens and low-level 
decisionmakers visible to the polity in a system where the views of dissenting 
non-elites are easily ignored. Second, where dissenting by deciding is possible, 
people who do not have much power in the system get to control a part of it.  
Decisional dissent thus gives average citizens not only an opportunity to reform 
the system, but an incentive to do so—a genuine reason for calling it their own. 
Finally, group members who usually serve the state in relative isolation get a 
chance to act collectively, perhaps generating more political energy than 
conventional dissent in such instances. In sum, if we are worried about bottom-
up reform174—the hope that the views of everyday citizens will result in 
transformative change—dissenting by deciding represents an intriguing 
institutional strategy for fostering dissent. 
Envisioning everyday acts of citizenship as a form of dissent, of course, 
might change the way we view dissent and dissenters. If the notion of 
“dissenting by deciding” were to become as deeply embedded in the American 
“patois” as conventional dissent, we might have a quite different view of what 
it means to dissent. The overlay of dissent might invest everyday acts of 
citizenship with greater meaning, making it more likely that people will 
connect the nitty-gritty details of governance to involvement in a national 
conversation or view participation as a chance to pursue radical change through 
incremental means. 
 
171. See supra note 123 and accompanying text; Gerken, supra note 31, at 1150 
(describing minority-dominated decisionmaking bodies as a “process-based strategy for 
combating subordination, using the processes that tend to reinforce status inequalities to 
erode them”). 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 49-Error! Bookmark not defined.. 
173. Id. 
174. See, e.g., SHIFFRIN, DISSENT, supra note 2, at 76 (noting that “it seems unlikely 
that the most important or effective criticism of abuse of power will come from the most 
powerful”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Should the arguments above prove persuasive, much work remains to be 
done on this project. Most obviously, this paper is a conceptual and normative 
project, not an empirical one. Significant empirical work remains before we can 
fully assess the merits of conventional dissent and dissenting by deciding as 
competing—or complementary—strategies for institutionalizing dissent. 
Moreover, any such assessment requires more information about the context—
what type of institution is involved, what type of dissenter we are describing, 
what are the precise political dynamics at stake, etc. 
Nonetheless, if one shares Steven Shiffrin’s view that “the institutional 
promotion of dissent is necessary to combat injustice,”175 this paper represents 
a first step toward building a more comprehensive framework for evaluating 
how best to institutionalize dissent. What this analysis reveals is that dissenting 
by deciding is a quite different strategy for channeling dissent than our usual 
conception of dissent. It furthers the values we associate with dissent in 
different ways, thus providing us more flexibility in achieving the aims of a 
healthy democracy. 
At first glance, dissenting by deciding may seem more radical than 
conventional dissent, because electoral minorities are able to use the apparatus 
of governance to express disagreement. If we look closer, decisional dissent 
may make dissent less radical because it is incremental—it takes place within a 
space chosen by the majority—and it directs the energies of dissenters toward 
governance as well as resistance. Decisional dissent may empower dissenters, 
or it may tame dissent by undermining its rebellious or iconoclastic 
possibilities. Should the notion take root, the notion of dissenting by deciding 
seems likely to help us think of dissent as an everyday act of citizenship, rather 
than an act of disaffiliation. 
What is perhaps most intriguing about dissenting by deciding, however, is 
its transformative possibilities. As noted above, decisional dissent seems 
unusually well suited to generating political energy at the lower end of the 
political hierarchy. If one thinks that radical reform is most likely to emerge 
bottom-up rather than top-down—from average citizens rather than dissenting 
elites—dissenting by deciding offers an intriguing avenue for further 
exploration. It holds out the possibility of radical incrementalism, the potential 
power associated with an everyday act of citizenship, and the possibility that 
dissent may be understood more as a practice than a status, governance rather 
than politics. 
 
175. Id. at 91. 
